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SUMMARY 
This paper is written from the Standpoint of a participant observer and forms an 
exploratory case study examining the ethical dimension of commercial médiation in the 
context of its professionalisation. It brings together a serres of papers written between 
April 2001 and June 2002. They are presented here in a revised form and différent order 
as chapters oscillating between the changing context of commercial médiation and a 
discussion of particular sociological and ethical concepts. 
The paper attempts to identify the theoretical territory of the study of professions and 
professionalisation and the ethical perspectives and moral catégories which describe 
the territory. It addresses the problems encountered in attempts to develop an abstract 
theory of professions which has generally been polarised between attribute and 
processual approaches. Issues which émerge include conflicts of professional rôles 
arising from différent understandings of what a profession is for, the duty of a profession 
to serve the public good, the legitimacy of professional authority and the accountability 
of Professionals. These issues are often expressed as a tension between the ideal of 
autonomy of a profession and consumer demand for accountability; a tension between 
the principles of service on which a profession is said to be ethically based and an 
ethics of responsibility demanded by the market. At the same time, the economic 
context in which professions émerge and develop gives rise to ethical considérations 
about the effects of the dominant economic System and the function of trust as an 
élément of social capital. 
The approach in this paper is to take professionalisation as a dynamic and historical 
concept which involves both an ideological and ethical strategy in the development of an 
occupational group. It suggests that ethical perception in Professionals could develop 
more practicalîy by freeing the conceptualisation of professions from making distinctions 
in ethical rôles between professions and business based on the oppositions of shared 
and self interest. The relevant emphasis rests not in what Professionals do and how long 
they take to learn to do it but who Professionals are as persons; that is, the différence 
between being a professional and being professional. But clearly professional work does 
not lie in just 'being'. The degree to which a professional is required in commercial 
médiation is one that the concept of the trusted mediator must account for. Using this 
concept to develop an ethical framework, the paper finally discusses policy implications 
regarding the professionalisation of commercial médiation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Context: professionalising commercial médiation 
The story of commercial médiation in the UK really starts in 1989 with the formation of 
IDR Europe Ltd. (now A D R Group) followed in 1990 by the establishment of the Centre 
for Dispute Resolution (CEDR), which was backed by the Confédération of British 
Industry and specifically set up to promote and advance the fieid. But it is in the last six 
years that commercial médiation practice has accelerated and has been associated with 
a séries of key events underpinned by increasing government interest and support. With 
this support also came the government's call for professionalism: 
'It is in the interests of those who provide ADR to ensure that their services are 
professional, governed by universaliy-recognised competencies and, above ail, 
to ensure that they provide a service that people do need...Those who are able 
to offer compétent and successful ADR and médiation services will fmd they are 
part of a burgeoning-and a profitable-new profession' (The Lord Chancellor, Jan 
1999. inaugural lecture to the Faculty of Médiation and ADR of the Academy of 
Experts). 
Commercial médiation, however, represents only one area of médiation practice. The 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) has provided a médiation service 
in the industrial relations sector since 1974, and the family and community sectors have 
been developing independently since the early 1990s. New areas such as personal 
injury and clinical négligence are now also beginning to corne into prominence. In 
addition, médiation is practised by both lawyers and non-lawyers, by volunteers, paid 
practitioners, and is familiar to international diplomacy, many religious groups and 
cultures. 
But as part of a new social phenomenon, commercial médiation in the UK has yet to 
respond to questions regarding professionalisation and the parailel development of 
ethical perception in practitioners beyond regulatory measures and codes. 1 Expérience 
in North America and Australia, where commercial médiation has a longer history, points 
to related concerns. 
/( has been pointed out that unlike most other professional services, the offer of médiation requires that at 
least two clients commit themselves to the service. This is further complicated in that the décision to commit is 
offen made by more than one person. Because of this it can be argued that the potential exploitation of 
individual clients is restncted and that the justification of régulation is limited to special circumstances: for 
example, agreements which may affect third parties such as minors or cases in which the mediator is not 
sensitive to the issue of power imbalances in carving out agreements which may be considered unfair. 
(Mackie, 1997: pp. 377-378) 
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Morris (1997) has referred to debates on the professionalisation of dispute resolution in 
North America as a policy debate at ethical level. One of the questions she raises is how 
far a growing 'profession' (her parenthèses) should influence the définition of médiation 
or how it is practised. 
Policy on ethics in médiation practice is related to what différent types of médiation are 
claimed to offer and the values attributed to them. These Claims will differ in accordance 
with the différent objectives (moral objects) which are considered to be served by 
médiation processes which could include one or a combination of social order, social 
transformation, social justice, or party autonomy and self-determination. 
Morris says that policy makers need to balance methods of accountability which do not 
harbour 'prestige-building and monopoly-seeking by opportunists who see médiation as 
an opportunity to be part of a growth industry' and wams that 'policy makers need to be 
aware of moves toward art élite, exclusive, formalised profession which promote North 
American values of autonomy and objectivity and ignore the spectrum of cultures and 
types of practice in dispute résolution' 2 (Morris, 1997: p.345). In Australia it has also 
been asked whether médiation will 'be distorted so that it actually reinforces the broader 
social idéologies and come to have a System maintenance function' (Boulle, 2000: p7). 
These views indicate that it is difficult to ignore the dominant values of the free market. 
Individualism, self-governance, equality and the security and advancement of private 
enterprise form the economic context in which médiation in western society is 
developing. Mediation can be said to already share some of the values of the market 
place; there is an emphasis on privacy and confidentiality, self-interest and dispute 
ownership, all of which are seen as the plus points of commercial médiation and appear 
to point to a decrease in the area of direct state influence and activity. 
However, médiation can include other values such as collaborative problem-solving, 
Community solidarity and empowerment. How do thèse non-market values square with 
the prevailing social and economic climate at a global level where the boundaries of 
financial investment are being eroded through an increasing shift in power from 
governments to financial institutions and increasing cross-border Operations by business 
and the professions? (Boulle,2000) Also, how do the personal values of individuels in 
médiation practice square with those of the publicly expressed values of the 
professional group or organisation with which they are associated? 
The focus of ethics here is on interpersonal relations and interdependent communities of mediators. To 
reflect this interdépendance Morris suggests we tum from an ethics of rights to an ethics of responsibility. 
However it is not ctear whether this refers sotety to the responsibility of the medtator communjfy (o the public 
generally or includes personal responsibility to the mediator Community or, indeed, both. 
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In addressing Morris' and Boulie's concerns, perhaps we are still left with having to give 
a contemporary response to some of the Claims made in an unprecedented assault on 
Professionals: 
'As moral entrepreneur, he [the professional] acts the role of priest. He créâtes 
the need for his médiation. As crusading helper, he acts the part of the 
missionary and hunts down the underprivileged. Public affairs pass from the 
layperson's elected peers into the hands of a self-accrediting élite' 3 (Wich, 
1978: p.65). 
Ignoring the fact that Wich is silent on the matter of what part laypersons have played in 
their own downfall and that we are not given an account of how the State acts as 
'suprême manager of professional services', how do we deal with the problem of the 
'moral entrepreneur?' 
Trust 
One way of looking at this could be to acknowledge that trust building groups may be 
increasingly important in a global society and that the way we look at trust, at both 
individual and organisational level, may be more engagtng if we divert the focus of our 
attention from the theoretical polarisation of duty and agent ethics to look at human 
capacities (character) defined by the virtues. The potential for this may be found in one 
of the findings in a survey jointly initiated by C E D R and the law firm of Pinsent Curtis in 
April 2000. 4 
In response to the question 'what personal qualities would you look for when appointing 
a mediator to résolve a business dispute?' the top five qualities in order of priority were 
considered to be: 
• expertise in the particular sector of dispute 
professionalism 
impartiality 
• knowledge of the law 
• integrity 5 
lllich's use ofthe word médiation refers to the intervention of a professional not a mediator. 
4 
Telephone poil of UK law fîrms carned out by Market and Opinion Research International. 
5 Other qualities listed (in descending order) were, empathy. specialist in médiation, diplomacy, charisma, 
pragmatism, tndustry qualifications, patience, personality, good negotiating skills, intelligence, 
gravitas/maturity and methodical/attention to detail. 
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The attribution of values to commercial mediators is significant in that the term 
'professionalism' is identified as a separate value from expertise, impartiality and 
integrity; values which are otherwise easy to assume as being encompassed by the 
term. 
Morris features 'the trusted mediator' as the concluding title in her analysis of ethics in 
mediation but does not leave room for the possibility that the social function and 
meanings of trust may change or relate in different ways to our understanding of the 
term profession. Where Morris, ends with the concept of the trusted mediator and the 
'warning-bells' of professional self-interest, this project Starts with the trusted mediator 
as the organising concept to be studied. 
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1 M E T H O D O L O G Y AND A P P R O A C H 
'The professional worker can subject himseifto ihe institutionalism and codified 
ethics and étiquette of his professional association, and conform to the 
principies of scientific objectivity, but to act on thèse rat'tonally and logicafly he 
must use his own living desires and make the best use of his own personaiity'. 
(Halmos, 1970: p.185) 
Much of what has been written about commercial médiation has corne out of the 
practical expérience of leaders in the field. Together with the research objectives and 
findings of pilot médiation schemes and consultation papers initiated by government 
departments, the literature is based upon certain values which may begin to reflect a 
broader view of the social function of commercial médiation. Also, in following the 
particular requirements of a rôle, people very often publicly articulate prescribed values 
whilst conceding them in private. But it is the extent to which a person may corne to 
privately accept the values expressed publicly in the particular social rôle that is the 
starting point hère. This transformation or rôle adaptation has been highlighted by 
Halmos (1970) and has a parallel in this research in that (adapting the words of Halmos) 
we can begin to explore whether the social rôle of commercial mediator can be seen as 
a sociological category; that is as a rôle constituting a set of functions without inferring 
that this set of functions has been institutionalised. 
Using C E D R and a number of its influential commercial mediators as a single case, the 
goals of this exploratory case study are: 
(1) to see to what extent thèse commercial mediators privately accept the publicly 
expressed values and moral assumptions of commercial médiation 
(2) how this squares with their motivation to practise in the field and 
(3) the extent to which their responses may be adequately expressed through the 
concept of the trusted mediator and used as a potential ethical framework for 
the professionalisation of commercial médiation. 
Qualitative research methodology 
To describe the methodological approach we are adopting, we first need to distinguish 
between scientific understanding which aims to explain appearances, and intentional 
understanding which aims to interpret those appearances through the concepts by 
which we expérience and make sensé of our interactions in the world. 
Intentionality means identifying descriptions under which conceptualisations of the world 
are presented and which we construct out of subjective expérience. And it is intentional 
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understanding which détermines the phenomenological nature of this research project 
in that it is meaning (and personal motivation) which forms ils central subject matter and 
involves looking at the public language of appearance. 
However, in saying that the research is phenomenological in nature we distance this 
from certain branches of phenomenology and associated methods of analysis. 6 This 
refers in particular to phenomenography which firstly attempts to start without a 
particular view or hypothesis and, secondly, assumes that the researcher can be a 
wholly detached and impartial observer, able to discount ail preconceptions. The first 
feature is shared in particular with ethnography, a qualitative approach which also relies 
on detailed observation but which is not fundamental to case studies. In other words, we 
are looking at a qualitative case study applied to a particular phenomenological 
research orientation which will be distinguished by its analytical method. 
To begin with, Yin (1994) differentiates between descriptive, explanatory and 
exploratory case studies. A descriptive case study formulâtes constructs to organise 
data and relate to other research findings and thèmes which identify the important 
features of a case. Robson (1993) sees the purpose of descriptive research as giving a 
profile of the case study subject which requires in-depth knowledge of the research 
subject to enable the identification of aspects on which to gather information. This does 
not mean that the researcher describes everything but, as Yin maintains, places a 
responsibility on the researcher to be sélective in order to focus on the aim of the study. 
For exploratory case studies Yin uses the analogy of exploration to suggest that 
rationale and direction based on initial assumptions, even if proved wrong later, should 
underpîn exploratory case studies. 
Whilst Yin defines case study in terms of the process involved in carrying out the 
research and the unit of analysis, others turn to the significance of defining the unit of 
Phenomenology Starts with Husseh's attack on psychologism (the attempt to absorb logic into empihcal 
psychology) in Logische Untersuchungen, 1900-1901. Referred to as descriptive phenomenology in its 
approach to objects and objects as encountered, this is the source of four main tnbutaries of phenomenology 
(1) Realistic phenomenology places emphasis on the pursuit of universal essences of human actions, motives 
and self In this vein the philosophy of law (Reinach) and ethics (Schaler) became subjects of study (2) 
Constitutive phenomenology, thggered again by Husserl (Ideen zu einer reinen Phénoménologie und 
Phenomenologischen Philosophie 1, 1913) concentrâtes on phenomenological method; in particular the 
method which involves temporarily discarding all our preconceptions of conscious life as something that exists 
in the wodd, and is done with the aim of obtaining an essential inter-subjective basis for the world (3) Topics 
such as action, conflict, désire and death are covered by existential phenomenology. Amongst its exponents, 
Merleau-Ponty used Gestalt psychology to describe perception and Sartre colonised the topics offreedom and 
literature (4) And developing the method set out in Heideggers Being and Time (1927) which proposes that 
human existence is interprétative, hermeneutical phenomenology addresses the method of interprétation. For 
Heidegger appearances are phenomena and phenomenology examines the disclosure of a thing in 
appearance and not the appearance itself. 
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study. For Merriam (1988) if no boundaries are set upon the phenomenon under study 
then it is not a case. 7 
Following an interpretive model of case s tudy 8 , Gall (1966) identifies three ways of 
analysing data: interpretational, structural and reflective. The first of thèse involves a 
process of scrutinising data in order to find patterns, thèmes or constructs. Analysis 
Starts with the development of catégories to bring together the data; each category 
being représentative of a particular type of phenomenon. In structural analysis, data are 
examined to identify patterns in conversational text, events or other phenomena and, in 
contrast to interpretational analysis, the researcher is not required to superimpose 
meaning on the data. 
Applying to this exploratory case study, reflective analysis acknowledges that data can 
be described based on the researcher's initial spéculation rather than as a resuit of 
catégorisation. 9 The counterpart of this approach is to be found in phenomenographic 
analysis which aims to develop catégories of description for the différent ways in which 
a thing is understood; those catégories being regarded as a map of the 'collective 
mind. ' 1 0 
In phenomenography, data are gathered into bundles, each bündle comprising éléments 
(utterances) which show a unique facet of the phenomenon. These bundles of data are 
studied on the basis of their internai consistency and the relations between them. Put 
another way, catégories (data constructions) are composed by the researcher in order 
to explore the ability of the data to explain its füll range of variations. 
However, there is a difficulty in that the meanings given to subjects' Statements cannot 
be taken as meaning bearing unless their éléments have been identified against the 
background of ail meanings in the research. The criticism which follows is that it is not 
always clear whether subjects' Statements obtain their meaning in relation to the 
One way for judging 'boundedness' is to see if there is a lîmit to the number of people who could be 
interviewed or observations which could be made. 
Case study can be applied to interpretive, positivist and chtical research onentations. Interpretive 
researchers work from the basis that access to reality is gained through language, consciousness and shared 
meaning. For positivists like Yin (1994), knowledge of reality is objectively given and can be described by 
measurable properties which are independent of the researcher. Merriam (1998) identifies critical research as 
an ideological critique of power and oppression offen directed to influence policy change. It starts from the 
assumption that social reality is a histoncal concept that can be constructed and reconstructed. Chtical 
research looks at the conflict to be found in society and is ideological in that it has a mission to help society hd 
the causes of oppression and aliénation. 
g 
As such, 'conclusions ' are an inappropnate term for the end resuit of the study because the reflective 
approach allows greater freedom for research interprétation and évaluation which is not limited by the 
requirement to catégorise data. 
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That there is no consensus on what catégories of description are and what they actually show is no 
différent from the divergent views regarding the findings of qualitative research generally. 
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research as it unfolds or whether they emerge from preconceived ideas. Meanings may 
be given by the researcher through personal bias and through the researcher's 
manipulation of the interview which Miller and Dingwall (1997) distinguish from 
conversation. 
A n interview is a specific occasion for discussing a subject that is of interest to the 
interviewer but may not be of interest to the interviewee. As such, the interviewee, 
whether interested in the subject or not, wants to come out of the interview having 
shown his or her proficiency as a member of the community which the interviewer calls 
upon .The result is that interview data become social constructs produced by the 
interviewee and the reactions and prompts of the interviewer regarding the acceptance 
or not of what is being said. This is discussed in relation to all types of interview which is 
contrasted with observation by saying that 'interviewers construct data and observers 
find it'. Miller and Dingwall do not dismiss interviews totally. Obviously it depends on 
what the researcher is after; some phenomena cannot be observed directly by the 
researcher. However, the point which they do not acknowledge is that in both interviews 
and conversations we direct our attention to something and talk about it, even if this is 
limited to asking a question in the expectation of being answered by either 'yes' or 'no'. 
On Miller and Dingwall's account phenomenographic analysis would have to extend to 
exploring how far categorised statements have been influenced by 'production relations' 
which may change the original subjective meaning they carried. If not, the validity of 
phenomenographic research is open to the criticism that the researcher categorises only 
on the basis of a hunch and that a statement about something really does say 
something about the phenomenon. Consequently, the research analysis is said to suffer 
because of the perspective adopted through the researcher's own concepts. However, 
this criticism and its supporting arguments are diluted if one accepts that: 
speculation (a hunch, hypothesis or intuition) is the starting point of any exploration 
it is not possible to avoid some level of personal influence in the research since the 
researcher unavoidably uses himself or herself as an instrument of his or her own 
research; that is, it is not possible to start with a 'blank sheet' and, related to this, 
• it is not the researcher's objectivity which is the issue but the researcher's claim to 
objectivity. 
Having highlighted the problems associated with the objectives of phenomenographic 
analysis, research validity and reliability require different emphases. Those working in 
the positivist tradition may consider that as an analytic method reflective analysis does 
not meet objectivity as a criterion of validity. Yet the approach does allow readers and 
colleagues to see the researcher's perspective and determine how it compares with 
13 
their own, so long as opportunities are given for others to give comment during the 
course of the research. In that sense reliability becomes more a function of the 
credibility and authority of the researcher's knowledge claims and role in the research. 
This is compatible with Stake (1995) who, in countering a common criticism of case 
studies as not producing generalisable findings, argues for an approach based on a 
close relationship between readers' experiences and the case study. Data generated by 
case studies react with the personal experience of readers which enables a more 
thorough understanding of the phenomenon. In other words, the researcher is able to 
use his own knowledge of the community in which he or she operates to interpret data 
rather than analysing this interpretation on a solely procedural basis. 
This returns us to intentional understanding and to be reminded that Husserl, with whom 
phenomenology began, abandoned his initial enterprise of developing a methodology 
which is purely descriptive and without preconception or presupposition in favour of 
looking to meaning as always involved in the 'lived world' or Lebenswelt: a concept 
which locates consciousness in the body, history and social world. 1 1 Intentional 
understanding 'tries not so much to explain the world as to be at home in it' (Scruton, 
1990: p. 108). 
Our research approach and its justification, therefore, is defined as phenomenological in 
that if phenomenology is the practise of studying the Lebenswelt through the perception 
of individuals and does not seek to detach the researcher from the world of 
appearances which he or she is a part, then it is possible for the researcher to compare 
his or her understanding of reality with that of others through concepts which the 
researcher puts forward but which, nevertheless, may still be incomplete or rejected by 
others as inappropriate. This has influenced the case study strategy and composition. 
Case study composition, validation and chapter outlines 
The summary mentioned that this paper is composed of a series of papers that were 
written as the case study proceeded. These papers were published electronically on 
C E D R ' s website comprising an introductory paper, a theory level paper which discussed 
conceptual components, followed by two further papers (described as research level 
papers) which began to locate the conceptual components within the case. 
The issue of objectivity (being value-free) has the same poignancy in research as it 
does in the field of mediation. Having said that the phenomenological nature of the 
research is determined by our focus on meaning and personal motivation and that the 
subjective experience of research participants extends to the researcher through 
Phenomenology, which stresses the conscious form of meaning, should be contrasted with psychoanalysis 
which strives to grasp subconscious desires. There is also a contrast in Marxist analysis and social theories 
which rank the individual second to the social and historic factors of one's time. 
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reflective analysis in which data are described through the researcher's concepts and 
speculation, it presents a challenge to the idea that validity is met through techniques 
such as data or investigator thangulation when they are included as part of the research 
design. The point is that whilst these techniques suggest objectivity, what we produce 
through our research is something socially constructed. 
Qualitative research strives: 
'not to produce knowledge of the social world as an entity but to engage in 
knowledge making as a human activity. This is fundamentally a normative 
undertaking. It requires that we come to terms with a sense of moral purpose 
and responsibility in human inquiry' (Schwandt, 1993: p.19). 
This places an obligation on qualitative researchers to investigate their selves at the 
same time as they are investigating others (Berg and Smith, 1988). 
Following Lincoln and Guba (1985), we prefer to speak of trustworthiness rather than 
validity in qualitative research. But, like Smith (1998), we do not take Lincoln and Guba's 
criteria for research as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability; rather 
reflexivity, transparency, moral reasoning and persuasiveness. 
So to defend our reflective analytical approach, and to step outside the argument that 
such analysis does not meet objectivity as a criterion of research validity, we must 
ensure that research participants have the opportunity to compare their perspectives 
with that of the researcher. It is for that reason that all papers written at the time were 
sent to interviewees before their interviews took place. 
The initial theory level paper (Chapter 3 here) pre-empted the document research and 
interviews with mediators as part of the fieldwork. Analogous to a theory building 
structure described by Yin (1994), each paper was seen as a chapter engaging and 
illustrating a new theme in the development of the interpretation. 
The themes and the conceptual territory covered are shown diagrammatically in Figure 
1. It shows that the trusted mediator sits at the crossroads of competing values; the 
general problematic. It also locates two specific problematic situations for the 
commercial mediator and the mediation service provider. The first is inevitable in that in 
any dispute there will always be more than one party; the client, therefore, is complex. 
Second, at this stage in the development of commercial mediation, the mediator's 
ethical role itself needs to be examined and developed in a way that is not reliant upon 
or bound by the lawyer's role. 
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Fig 1. The trustée) mediator: the problem of reconciling competing values 
This paper covers the same territory but the order of chapters and components within 
the chapters does not reflect the order in which the individual papers were written and 
made public sînee the case study involved the search for a conceptual approach to 
make sensé of a changing context. This has resulted in a small but important change to 
the original title of the paper from The Trusted Mediator: developing a framework for 
practitioner ethics in the occupation of commercial médiation to The Trusted Mediator: 
developing an ethical framework for the professionalisation of commercial médiation. 
The change reflects emphasis on how practitioners locate themselves ethically in an 
occupation that is being professionalised and how they might work in the future rather 
than ethics in their practice. 
This runs in tandem with the point that the accelerating development of the occupation 
of commercial médiation coupled with the fact that this project was carried out by a 
single researcher did not make it possible to interview {as one of the data collection 
methods) a large number of commercial mediators. However, the aim was not Statistical 
validity involving many participants where persuasive inference is dépendant upon 
factors that can be identified in more than one participant, lnstead, the aim was for 
qualitative validity in phenomenological research which focuses on factors and their 
impact on individual participants. Grealer emphasis was placed on collecting in-depth 
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Information from a smali number of participants. As a conséquence we must be mindful 
in suggesting the level of those factors présent in the group from which participants are 
taken. And we must also underline that the focus of the case study was C E D R and that 
the outcome of the research should be interpreted specifically in the context of that 
organisation. 
The chapters, then, progress as follows: 
Chapter 2 examines the values of commercial médiation as seen by government and 
the legal profession which involves a brief chronological account of the development of 
commercial médiation and a review of market trends and responses to its development 
together with the ethical undercurrents which accompany the professionalising of 
médiation. 
The main points in this chapter are grounded by références (in text boxes listed as 
figures) to CEDR 's re-branding project and associated research, the outcome of which 
was to split C E D R into two defined brands: C E D R , concerning itself with the promotion 
of the growth of the market, training, research and development activities and C E D R 
Solve, the practice arm of C E D R , concerning itself with driving market share and its own 
standard of practice. 
Chapter 3 looks at the nature of discussion on professions and the ethical role and 
status of Professionals. It introduces virtue ethics as an ethical approach and the 
concept of social capital, a key element of which is trust. 
Chapter 4 takes a more detailed look at trust which has been conceived in many ways; 
as a form of interpersonal relations, as anticipated good will, as a character trait, as a 
social resource and others. Trust is also often described in the sensé of a medium in 
which interpersonal relationships take place; hence expressions like a 'climate of trust' 
or 'atmosphère of trust'. So there appears to be a choice as to how one thinks of trust 
and the meanings attributed to the concept. 
A s an abstract concept, trust is not possible to observe. Its existence and boundaries, 
however, can be inferred by identifying its linguistic characteristics. These 
characteristics indicate the fact that they reflect différent empirical aspects. 
Observational catégories, therefore, can be determined by looking at how we use the 
term trust. 
Virtue ethics is highlighted regarding its relevance to trust and moral motivation. 
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Chapter 5 begins with summarising the theoretical framework as it has unfolded in the 
previous chapters and then goes on to set out our conceptualisation of values and 
analytic strategy for interviews with C E D R mediators. 
Chapter 6 returns to commercial mediation and looks at what a small group of 'key 
player' commercial mediators are saying about their own motivation, roles and sense of 
responsibility and how congruent their values are with those expressed by government. 
Chapter 7 draws on the value components discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 within the 
conceptual framework developed in chapters 3 and 4 for the trusted mediator. A line is 
drawn between being a professional by means of belonging to a professional body and 
being professional. The former does not necessarily secure the latter and the latter is 
not something that can be brought about by regulation. The distinction between being 
professional and being a professional is used to give an ethical framework for policy 
implications regarding the professionalisation of commercial mediation. 1 2 A final section 
briefly lists the continuing work derived from this case study. 
For, as yet, a non- institutionaüsed occupationa! group. 
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2 TRANSFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE S Y S T E M 
M¡festones in the development of commercíal mediation 
Although commercíal mediation has to a large extent developed independently of other 
key mediation áreas, it cannot be looked at in isolation. Thi's is because of the legal 
profession's, the government's and the judiciary's interests in what can be called the 
mediation movement as a whole and because the effectiveness of all key mediation 
áreas has been linked to the effectiveness of the Civil Justice System. 
The integration of mediation into the Civil Justice System in England and Wales 
progressed significantly in the mid 1990s. Government figures showed that spending on 
Civil and family legal aid had increased from £586m in 1992-1993 to £783m in 1997-
1998. The increase in expenditure in that five year period was 35 per cent compared 
with an overall inflation figure of 13 per cent. Also, the number of people who received 
help under the Legal Aid system had decreased which meant that the rise in 
expenditure was accounted for by an increase in the cost of each individual case. 
This prompted the Government to look at A D R (Alternative Dispute Resolution) to 
reduce court congestión which included examining the claimed advantages of mediation 
1 3 over litigation; lower cost, user satisfaction, settlement rates, the durability of 
agreement and the preservation of relationships. 
In 1995 Lord Woolf published his report, Access to Justice to the Lord Chancellor. The 
report addressed the concerns dealing with the processes leadíng to Court decisions 
rather than the decisions themselves. 1 4 The three key problem áreas which were 
ídentified were cost, delay and complexity. These were seen to arise from 'the 
uncontrolled nature of the litigation process' (Woolf, 1995: p.3) an aspect of which 
derived from the lack of judicial responsibility for the management of cases and 
oversight of administration of the civil courts. Without judicial control, the process of 
litigation, which by nature is adversarial, would be subverted by encouraging an 
adversarial culture and a culture of delay in which no rules applied. 
Lord Woolf envisaged a new 'litigation landscape' where starting court proceedings to 
resolve disputes would be a last resort after using other more appropriate means if 
avaiíable. U was also clear that Lord Wool fs reforms were intended to curb the worst 
1 1 ADR has become synonymous with mediation and the tenns are often used interchangeably. 
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A concern addressed on many occasions. The last significant report on the civil justice System was the Civil 
Justice Review in 1985. 
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excesses of litigation practice by having a direct impact on íhe income of litigation 
lawyers . 1 5 
A D R was acknowledged as having the benefit of saving court time and resources and 
provided benefits for the disputants too. Reference was made to the use of mediation as 
a mechanism to prevent the escalation of disputes prior to legal proceedings and also to 
assist the settlement of disputes without the need of going to trial or, if no settlement is 
reached, ís able to narrow the issues in dispute. 
Lawyers were urged to take responsibility for famiiiarising themselves and their clients 
with A D R options. This was reinforced by a recommendation that at every case 
management conference and pre-trial review the parties would be required to say 
whether they had considered ADR and if not, why not. 
Whatever the benefits, mandatory A D R as a precursor to litigation proceedings or wholly 
as an alternative to litigation was not proposed as this could be seen as an erosión of a 
person's entitlement to apply to the Courts in circumstances where prívate rights or 
duties by a public body had been breached. 
Monitoring and evaluation were also thought to be required. The high success rates 
claimed by mediation practitioners were considered to be based on too few numbers of 
cases which did not give sufficient indication of the 'permanence of mediated 
settlements' (Woolf, 1995: p. 146). The low number of mediation cases was linked to the 
lack of availability of legal aid for civil litigation cases. Although outside his remit, Lord 
Woolf considered that the Legal Aid Board could authorise the use of A D R under the 
terms of the legal aid certifícate in pilot schemes. In a similar vein, the use of an ADR 
scheme, if one was in place, could be taken into account when the grant of legal aid was 
being considered. 
The problems which Lord Woolf highlighted in the oíd litigation system were that it was: 
• too expensive; costs would often exceed the valué of the claim 
• ponderous in bringing a case to a conclusión 
• lacking equality in terms of those who were wealthy enough to pursue litigation and 
those who were not 
• lacking certainty in relation to time and cost 
• incomprehensible to many litigants 
• fragmented due to no clear overall responsibility for the adminístration of civil justice 
1 5 'A system that in many smaller cases pays more to the litigator than it does in compensation to the titigant is 
unnacceptabte' (Woolf, 1995: p. 10) and 'Deiay is of more benefit to íegat advisors than to parties- lt afíows 
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• too adversarial; cases were run by the parties not by the courts with rules often 
¡gnored by the parties and not enforced by the courts. 
To overeóme these problems Lord Woolf put forward a procedural change involving a 
number of key features. One of these was the encouragement of the use of A D R which 
was considered to be an aspect of active case management. 1 6 However, judges would 
nave to be convinced that those calling themselves mediators coutd, in fact, medíate: 
'...there are two ways in which ADR can really take hold. One is 
because the litigation system is so appalling that you have to find some 
alternative to litigation; people unwillingly are forceó into ADR. The 
other is a culture developing where people seek to resolve disputes 
reasonably, and that is a much better culture for ADR to work, and I 
believe that the Information that we have been having is producing an 
atmosphere within the dispute resolution industry which will enable ADR 
really to work well...ADR will only work well, and I want it to work well, if 
mediators are up to the job. There is nothing going to tum people off 
from ADR more quickly than if they have mediators who do not know 
what is involved in conducting a mediation properiy ...it is also critica! 
that in fact, those who take on the job of mediating know what they are 
doing. And we must pólice the mediation scene so those who can be 
described as cowboys do not find the opportunity to destroy the very 
good work which is being done by others' (Lord Woolf, C E D R Civil 
Justice Audít 7 April 2000: transcript p. 13). 1 7 
Driven by Lord WoolFs report, a court-annexed mediation pilot scheme for civil disputes 
was initiated by the Central London County Court in May 1996. The aim was to provide 
an informal way of settling disputes after court proceedings had begun. 1 8 
litigators to cany excessive caseloads'. (Woolf, 1995: p. 12) 
1 6 The other key features inctuded: 
• pre-action protocols to provide a clear procedural structure for both claimant and defendant and to 
resolve or clarify the nature of the dispute prior to the issue of a claim 
• Part 36 offers to enable claimants as well as defendants to make offers to settle 
- single joint experts to promote a co-operative approach between the parties as well as reducing costs 
a case management system were defended cases would be allocated one of three tracks by the court 
based primarily on claim valué; small claims track for personal injury cases, fast track and multi-track 
cases 
• a single set of rules for the high court and county courts 
1 7 But what is the character of conducting a mediation properiy? Does its emphasis lie in legal knowledge, 
case knowledge or knowledge of how people behave and respond? 
í s 
Run over two years, the pilot scheme dealt with claim valúes of between £3000 and £10,000. The scheme 
was voluntan/ and was offered once the proceedings had started. Each party paid a nominal sum towards the 
mediators fee and mediations were arranged within 28 days. Time limited mediations of three hours took 
place in the court building outside normal court hours. 
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The évaluation report on the pilot scheme which was published in 1998, revealed that 
despite the low numbers of those who participated in the scheme, most found that 
médiation was préférable to going to court and a satisfactory way of settling disputes. 
Settlements were achieved in 62 per cent of médiations and another 18 per cent of 
cases settled shortly after the médiation. Not surprisingly, scepticism about médiation 
was more likely to corne from those whose cases had not achieved seulement and the 
frustration that the attempt to reach an agreement had failed. Complaints generally feil 
into the category of those who felt under pressure to settle or that not enough pressure 
had been exerted by the mediator on the other party. 
In most of the pilot médiations lawyers accompanied their clients. Most of thèse lawyers 
had no previous expérience of médiation and found that the rôle they were expected to 
perform was very différent to that in a court hearing. Preparing for a médiation was 
likened to the préparation required for negotiation at settlement meetings between 
solicitors before trial. Lawyers were encouraged by the speed and informality of 
médiation and thought that it could save their clients' legal costs. They also 
acknowledged the contribution of mediators in achieving agreement. Most parties and 
their lawyers trusted their mediator and considered that the mediator was neutral and 
unbiased. Mediators were reported to have 'good personal skills and be experienced 
and knowledgeable about the law as well as having an understanding of the facts in the 
particular case being mediated' (Genn,1998: p.49). 
The Central London County Court scheme was put on a permanent footing in 1998. 
On another front, in 1996 Section 29 of the Family Law Act 1996 made legal aid 
available for médiation for the first time. As a resuit, parties were eligible to receive tegal 
aid for their divorce only after a meeting with a Legal Aid Board franchised mediator to 
assess their suitability for médiation. Mandatory médiation under section 29, however, 
was not received with universal enthusiasm. A report produced by Bristol University in 
early 2001 revealed that most cases referred to mandatory médiation found solicitors' 
advice more helpful than médiation. The chairman of the Law Society's Family Law 
Committee was reported as saying that the Lord Chancellor saw the use of médiation as 
no more than a cost-cutting exercise and that: 
'The whole Section 29 procedure-which triggers compulsory mediation-is wrong. 
It has also been assumed that solicitors shouldnt be involved in médiation, 
which is why it has not been working in family cases. If solicitors could be 
encouraged to be involved, I think it would be more widely used' (Gazette: 
Weekly Journal ofthe Law Society, 19 July 2001 pp. 22-23). 
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In October 1998 the Legal Aid Board announced that public funding should, in principle, 
be available for mediation. This was followed in December by the Government's White 
Paper, Modernising Justice which set out the aims and objectives of proposed reforms 
including consideration of how different types of A D R could contribute to making the civil 
justice system more fair and effective. 
With the coming into force of the new Civil Procedure Rules in April 1999, Lord Woolf s 
aim of making ADR an integral part of the justice system was put into effect. Judges 
were now able to order parties to attempt mediation and impose cost sanctions on 
parties who unreasonably refused to try A D R . As many have recognised, this power is 
one that the courts, litigants and the legal profession must take into serious account: 
'The judiciary will have a significant part to play in breaking down the 
preconception that only a full-blown court hearing can really right a wrong' 
(Genn,1999: p.59 quoting the Lord Chancellor). 
One year later the Access to Justice Act 1999 came into force in which the Legal 
Services Commission was given the power to refuse funding in cases where ADR or 
litigation funding was available to the applicant. 
In May 2000 the Lord Chancellor's Department published its report summarising the 
responses to its discussion paper on A D R . 1 9 Once again both the qualitative and cost 
benefits of mediation were highlighted 2 0 which no doubt served to increase one 
sceptical lawyer's antagonism towards the Lord Chancellor's Department's favourable 
publicity of mediation quoted in the report: 
'It is as if the Department of Health were to issue leaflets advocating the use of 
aromatherapy'. (Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000: p.3). 
Respondents thought that mediation was suitable for cases where no acknowledgement 
of distress by one party to another had yet been given and was a significant factor in the 
claimant's grievance against the defendant. Mediation was also thought to be suitable 
where a cost effective resolution was wanted coupled with the least possible stress, and 
for multi-party disputes. 
Respondents to the discussion paper were predominantly composed of legal professionals including the 
professional bodies of the Law Society, the Bar Council, ADR service providers and the judiciary. 
20 
The list included the rebuilding or preservation of relationships between disputants, privacy and 
confidentiality, informality, the reduction in stress and the cathartic effect, a forum for disputants to express 
themselves in their own way, ownership of the dispute and thereby having greater control of the dispute, and 
increased client involvement in the process compared to litigation. 
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Cases where parties are not représentée!, involve complex médical issues, where 
parties are not Willing to commit to the process or where a summary judgement is 
available were not thought to be appropriate for médiation. Concerns were also 
expressed in relation to parties participating in médiation for the wrong reasons. A party 
engaging in médiation could do so to test the strength of their case or simply use the 
process as a delaying tactic. One party could also end up with 'less than their legal due.' 
The report stated that some respondents did not consrder ADR would be unsuitable for 
public policy reasons with others commenting that parties are not bound by any duty to 
bring cases to court for the benefit of the public at large. Generally, it was thought that 
the development of the law would not be hindered by the increased use of ADR, 
As to the rôle of Government in the provision of ADR, comments ranged from those who 
thought limited involvement was necessary through éducation and quality control, to 
those who suggested that the Government should provide A D R services or mediators 
should be provided by the state. Many thought that ADR should be guided by market 
forces but subject to the need for quality control. But leaving the development of A D R in 
the hands of market forces was also seen to have negative conséquences; slow 
change, variable quality and take-over by lawyers were given as points of concern. Also, 
some litigants could be denied access to A D R because of commercial rates. This last 
concern emerged later in a letter published to the Law Society. One lawyer said that 
ADR is centred around large value complex cases which brings médiation and other 
dispute resolution processes out of the reach of high street solicitors. 
'Indeed, ADR and, especially médiation, are not particularly suited to high street 
work - and the first choice of most high street solicitors and their clients will 
remain Litigation, i think it is unlikely that the high street can assist with the 
dispute resolution révolution' (Gazette: Weekly Journal of the Law Society, 12 
July 2001 p.18). 
In other words, high value cases attract high commercial rates for mediators and access 
to médiation is denied to most people because they cannot afford to pay the fees of the 
mediator. 
In terms of quality control, common standards, a code of practice and a disciplinary 
code for mediators were generally favoured. Some members of the judiciary, however, 
thought this was still too early. Two thirds of respondents favoured self-regulation but 
also thought that Government should have a 'foot in the door' through endorsement and 
intervene if self- régulation failed. An over-arching organisation for family, community 
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and commercial médiation was seen as the quality control mechanism for self-
regulation. 2 1 
In March 2001 The Lord Chancellor's Department pledged that ail government 
departments would seek to avoid litigation by using médiation and other A D R processes 
wherever possible. Government departments and agencies would include clauses on 
A D R in their standard procurement contracts and Central Government would produce 
procurement guidance on différent ADR mechanisms available for Government 
disputes. One month later, the Lord Chancellor's Department published its report on the 
emerging findings of the effects of the Civil Procédure Rules 2 2 and issued a press 
reléase announcing the Government's intention to launch a new médiation quality mark 
for family and community médiation service providers. 
The commercial médiation market 
Reports from the Lord Chancellor's Department and médiation pilot surveys showed that 
most people who tried médiation liked it and would use it again. However, this positive 
reaction to médiation does not appear to have been reflected in any sustained rise in the 
number of médiations since the introduction of the new Civil Procédure Rules, when the 
number of médiations more than doubled. For the year 2000-2001 C E D R ' s figures 
showed a one per cent rise in médiations compared with the dramatic increase of 141 
per cent in the previous year . 2 3 
The text boxes which now appear (as figures) in this chapter highlight some of the key 
findings of C E D R ' s re-branding research. This is firstly because trust is integral to the 
concept of 'the brand' and also because C E D R , too, is a client in the sensé that it (as 
In 1997 a group of mediators r&presenting the main fíelds of mediation (family, community and commercial) 
carne together as the Joint Mediator Forum (JMF) to draft common mediation practico standards and to 
discuss the need, or otherwise, for an umbrella organisation for a nascent mediator profession. By 1999 the 
JMF thought it inappropríate that this umbreila organisation should regúlate and discipline mediators who 
contravened a common code ofconduct and become an institution in the form of established professions. In 
2002 the JMF is inactive. Its constituent members, particulariy the commercial mediation service providers, 
focusing more on enhancing and expanding market share. 
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The key ñndings ofthe report indicated that: 
• There has been a drop in the number of claims 
• Pre-action protocols appeared to be working weil to promote settlement before the issue of claims 
» 'Steps ofthe Court' settlements were decreasing and that settlements before the date of the heañng had 
risen 
There had been a rise in the use of ADR which suggests that parties were more likely to try alternative 
ways ofsettling claims 
The use of single joint experis appeared to be working well in the sense that their use made an ¡mpact 
on producing a less adversaria! culture, eartier settlement and, possibty, costs 
» Case management conferences were making an impact in tenns of reducing the complexity of litigation 
» The time between issue of claim and hearing for those cases that went to trial had decreased 
The number of appeals in the course of proceedings had dropped significantly 
• As to costs, it was too eariy to say. 
2ZAithough the small rise in CEDR's mediation numbers in 2000 is a reflection of the sharply distorted figure of 
the previous year. CEDRs figures, however, are not necessarily a mfíection of the market as a whole. 
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any other A D R service provider) acts as a gateway, routing disputants, their lawyers and 
mediators into the médiation process. 
Despite benefits for business being recognised, commercial médiation is perceived as: 
• a sign of compromise and weakness. 'People giving up' versus l've got a good case to win' (ln-
house tawyer) 
• not having a strong basis for business; médiation still requires context for discussion to be put 
on the business agenda: 
To i / have to be an evangelist for the cause within your organisation otherwise it doesn't 
stick. ' (In-house lawyer) 
There is also a perception that CEDR is too focused on the légal and political establishment in the UK 
and should look more globally, particularly where client organisations are global corporations and are 
not restricted to one légal jurisdiction. 
Fig 2. CEDR re-branding: perceptions of commercial médiation and CEDR 
It may be that whilst the légal profession is being encouraged by the judiciary to try 
médiation, it is those solicitors firms dealing with higher value cases in London who are 
more likely to suggest médiation to their clients. Thèse same firms have probably had 
partners and senior associâtes who have undergone mediator training, have 
championed médiation in their firms and who also wish to be put forward as mediators 
for cases by service providers. W e should also recognise that the Government's support 
of médiation owes more to its concern for escalating litigation costs and the influence of 
individual pioneers from within the légal profession than any cohesive organisation of 
mediators. Full-time mediators, whether they are lawyers or not, are rare. 
CEDR opérâtes in a sector lacking définition. It competes with both individual mediators and law firms. 
Law firms provide cases and supply mediators. Law firms also act as gatekeepers to médiation, 
retaining contro! of the client relationshjp, and often prefer to appoint individual mediators direetly. 
Whilst businesses are the end clients they, too, supply mediators. Individual mediators are seen as the 
only 'practice brands'. As such, médiation organisations are seen as largely unnecessary. But there is 
a weakness for potential clients operating in a network made up of many individuals. 
Most of those trained as mediators are full-time practitioners in other occupations, principally law. 
CEDR accréditation is highly valued and recognised but at the same time, the practice of médiation is 
not seen as a principal source of income or as the foundation to a career: more a semi-retirement role 
with emphasis placed on individual mediators. 
Fig 3. CEDR re-branding: lack of sector définition 
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Another aspect, related to the proportionately low but, nevertheless, steadily increasïng 
number of court-referred médiations, is that judges are not confident that mediators 
have, as yet, enough training and expérience. 2 4 A contrary view is that more judges 
need to be familiär with A D R . 2 5 
However, the slower rate of increase in the number of médiations must be put in the 
context of the culture change which the Civil Procédure Rules were intended to drive. A 
culture change and paradigm shift does not occur overnight. Coupled with an optimistic 
expectation, the small percentage of commercial mediators who are considered to be 
highly experienced practitioners in a market occupied by more mediators than available 
médiations has prompted résistance to externa! régulation and reliance, instead, on the 
market (clients) to décide which mediators and service providers can be t rusted. 2 6 
Those who are aware of CEDR see it as the médiation organisation which opérâtes beyond 
commercial goals; atthough some find CEDR's charity status and its associated social values 
incongruent with the business environment to which it must appeal and operate in. CEDR's 
impartiality and independence is highly valued together, again, with its mediator accréditation. The 
problem ts CEDR is not seen as a service provider. It cannot rest on its 'académie laurels'. Moreover, 
CEDR has received criticism of its mediator relations. As one in-house lawyer put it: 
'/( turns ouf mediators but then leaves them to sort themselves ouf 
Amongst other factors in the branding of CEDR Solve such as raising service standards and 
rémunération, CEDR Solve will require a clearer relationship with the mediators with which it wishes to 
work. 
Fig 4. CEDR re-branding: tension in perceived CEDR values 
Commercial médiation services brought to an increasingly sophisticated market may 
have little need for external régulation when clients themselves are able to corne to their 
own décisions about the quality of mediators. This is différent to family and community 
médiation services, for example, which are currently provided more widely. In this case 
the Government, through the Community Légal Service, has introduced the quality 
médiation mark in an attempt to ensure that service provision is set within a structure 
where service providers take responsibility for the quality of their serv ice . 2 7 
See Gazette: Weekly Journal of the Law Society. 19 Juty 2000, p.23. 
2 5 A point that the Judicial Studies Board is addressing. 
2 6 See The men from the boys'p.37 The Lawyer. 10 Sept 2001 
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There have been discussions for some time over whether a gênerai kite mark standard of quality and ethics 
is needed for ail médiation provision but thèse discussions have been stymied by the difficulty of identifying an 
appropriate administrative body. See also footnołe 21. 
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Another reason that external régulation is problematic is associated with the difficulty in 
dealing with a developing cross-disciplinary area of knowledge. Mediation is a derivative 
discipline (Fig 2). Language, sociology, and psychology are brought together to develop 
théories of communication. In turn communication théories overlap with problem solving 
and negotiation théories that are associated with l a w . 2 8 
MEDIATION 
T 
Law ~* Negotiation 
t 
Problem solving 
T 
Communication 
t 
Sociology Language Psychology 
Fig 5. The cross-disciplinary architecture of médiation 
If we take it that the term profession involves work that applies a defined body of 
knowledge and study and also involves judgement as to how aspects of that body of 
knowledge should be applied in practice, then the client will need to have some degree 
of trust in the professionale judgement. The difficulty with external régulation at this 
stage of médiation development is that we do not yet know what it is that is to be 
regulated. What is it that we are insisting mediators know? 
Mediation's core skill is seen to centre on facilitation not hard professional expertise: process skills 
versus technical specialism. 
Fig 6. CEDR re-branding: médiation and professional expertise 
Nevertheless, some service providers and mediators have said that external rules 
should be imposed on médiation practice; possibly more an attempt to establish status 
rather than professionalised work or a response to client demand for safety and 
certainty. 
Mediation as the practice of law or ADR? 
One of the points made in the preamble to C E D R ' s response to the Lord Chancellor's 
Department's discussion paper on A D R was that: 
A model put forward by Professor John Wade, Schoo! of Law, Bond University, Australia in an informai vîsit 
to CEDR in 2000. 
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'Mediation is inherentty a low-risk professional and dient activity. Except in 
cases of exceptional abuse, parties are regularly advised that any outcome has 
to be agreed by them. Advisers and arbitrators hold a much more powerful 
professional position. Also parties are more easily induced into a professional 
relationship with an adviser than into a médiation which needs at least two 
parties to initiale' ( CEDR, 2000: p.2) 
If the practice of médiation is seen as a lower risk activity than the practice of law then 
this assessment turns on the point that in médiation the offering of professional advice is 
absent. Mediators are seen as 'process designers' and 'process managers' who do not 
offer advice in the same way as a lawyer offers advice which is left for their clients to act 
upon or not. But there is more to add here. 
Some sceptical lawyers have given credence to médiation so long as strong 
associations with law practice can be applied. This is typified by Simmons ('Mediators 
offer little value'. The Lawyer. 13 Mar. 2000 p.33) who has argued that lawyers have the 
ability to negotiate between themselves, their clients and other parties without the need 
of a mediator. She says that achîeving compromise is as much the role of the lawyer as 
progressing a case towards resolution by a judicial décision. Compromise is achieved 
by negotiation which is within the capabilities of lawyers. 
In a médiation the dient may communicate something to the mediator which has not 
been revealed to the lawyer. She asks why the dient should trust the mediator but not 
the lawyer who will hear what has been disclosed during the médiation. There are two 
possibilities: that the dient is not aware of the role the lawyer can play in seulement 
negotiations and that the mediator is better at getting information out of the dient than 
the lawyer. If that is the case, why? Simmons also says that in the sphère of commercial 
activity negotiations frequently take place and without mediators. This again turns on the 
point of trust. She wonders how all parties in a dispute can put their trust in a third party 
(the mediator) and disclose confidential information which they would not disclose to the 
other parties. In another forum the third party would be faced with a conflict of interest 
which would exclude him or her from participation. 
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After over ten years of promoting the practice of commercial médiation, training mediators and 
conducting médiations in the commercial environment, CEDR's need for re-branding was summed up 
as: 
'CEDR are focked into a legal wortd view. They need to get higher up the food chain' (potential dient) 
This comment referred to the response CEDR must make in both increasing its own market share of 
médiations and increasing the promotion of médiation directly to businesses rather than through 
businesses' lawyers. 
Havíng determined two brands, one for CEDR's promotional activities and another for its dispute 
resolution services (now called CEDR Solve), the branding research continued with attempting to 
define an identity and name for CEDR's services arm. However, CEDR and CEDR Solve are not two 
physrcally separate organisations, they are made up of the same people working in the same location. 
What was CEDR asking clients ło trust? 
The approach in vol ved exploring three short-listed ñames and their associated characteristics and 
orientations derived from (1) what the service arm does, (2) haw it does it and (3) who it is. 
The accompanylng characteristics and competing values associated under each were: 
• For (1) business-like, a cali to action, emphasis on scope of knowledge and techniques. But too 
resuit focused, lacking humílity, steadfast but too inflexible. 
• For (2) mindset and process that can make a différence, unlocks a solution, helps the parties find 
inspired ways of moving forward, lateral thinking and sensitivity, exploring every avenue, flexible 
and open-minded. Inspiring to mediators because of the personal qualities required. But too 
process focused; clients buy results not process. 
• For (3) (whích most CEDR employées feit comfortable with) UK and international credentials, 
conflict resolution at the highest le vel t diversity of médiation usage; business and public sector. 
But too introspectivo rather than client facing, establishment (judiciary and government) oriented. 
The name finally adopted was not one of the short-listed names. That, however, is of secondary 
importance to CEDR's attempt to reconcile client, mediator and employée values in order to give a 
picture of its corporate personal¡ty which acknowledges both business and social values (or at least 
tries to acknowledge that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive). This is summed up in its 
mission Statement: 
'CEDR's mission is to encourage and develop médiation and other cost-effective dispute 
resolution and prévention techniques in commercial and public sector disputes. We are an 
independent non- profit organisation supported by multinational business and leading 
professional bodies. ' 
Integrity, impartiality, practicality, bravery and creativity were established as the core values as part of 
the final brand témplate. 
Fig 7. CEDR re-branding: CEDR's corporate personality 
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Although médiation is emerging as a by-product of legal practice, and is often said to 
work within the shadow of the law, that is not to say that médiation should be seen as 
being wrapped up in the practice of law or, put another way, coïncides with the activities 
which lawyers undertake for their clients. The question arises whether lawyers practising 
médiation see themselves as distinct from non-lawyer mediators or whether lawyers 
practising médiation see themselves with non-lawyers participating in a profession of 
alternative dispute resolution? 2 9 More broadly, however, the issues discussed in this 
chapter clearly relate to the question of the professionalisation of commercial médiation 
which, in turn, demands an examination of the concept of professionalisation itself. 
In the USA debate has been inftuenced by the associated question of whether evaluative, as opposed to 
facultative, médiation is seen to be within the remit of legal practice. In an evaluative médiation the medialer 
'reality tests ' the parties ' positions by asking questions about the stœngths and weaknesses of their cases and 
aiso offers an opinion on the likely outeome of a détermination by a judge or arbitrator. Also, the parties may 
ask the mediator to offer an opinion on the fair seulement or solution to the case. When this happens the 
mediator may need to consider, even marginally, the law as il applies to particular aspects of the dispute. 
Those who consider that this constitutes the practice of law are worried that non-lawyer mediators may put 
parties in a weak or detrimental position because of giving unreliable or erwneous information. The opposing 
view is that there are many instances were non-lawyers such as local government officers, architects, human 
resources managers and Jurors, apply the law to a specific situation and give recommandations or opinions 
without it being seen as the practice of law. (Cooley, 2001) 
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3 WHAT IS A PROFESSION? 
Structure v process 
Typifying the orthodox view of a professional continuum, Wilensky (1964), referring to 
occupations in the United States, describes the process of professionalisation as a 
series of five stages. The first stage involves the occupational group being involved in 
full-time work on a specified set of problems. This may occur due to the formation of a 
specialised body of knowledge within an existing occupation or profession - the 
likelihood being that professionalisation is more likely to occur where a fledgling 
occupation is already connected with a profession - or due to a service ideal where the 
occupation Claims that the service it provides is significant to society. 
The second stage includes establishing training, policies and procedures which 
overlaps with stage three in which a professional association is established to set 
Standards of practice and negotiates amongst other competing occupations and 
professions. 
These stages provide the foundation for the penultimate stage where the occupation 
strives for public recognition and State support for autonomy in the control of admission, 
methods of practice and developing curriculum. In the fifth and concluding stage, the 
occupation will publish a code of ethics. 
Elliott (1972), accepting Wilensky's description as a useful resume of the main features 
attributed to professions, suggests that this is tempered by looking at how the goals and 
activities of the profession are affected by each stage in the process. This is because 
the activities and goals of the occupation may be subject to change as well as the 
structure of the occupation. 
Similarly, Greenwood (1957) identifies five essential characteristics of the ideal 
profession which comprise of a theoretical body of knowledge, authority bestowed by its 
clients, Community sanction which enables control of entry and training, a code of ethics 
and, finally, a professional culture, the principal feature of which is the promotion of the 
value of service towards a social good. 
Newton (1983) reduces the number of attributes most usually associated with 
professions. These are limited to competence in a specialised area of knowledge, a 
pledge to the public good in that area and a pledge by individual Professionals to 
maintain the interests of individuals who seek their professional expertise. This last 
feature, associated with trust, can give rise to tension with the second feature. For 
example, the promise of confidentiality may clearly be at odds with the ethics of public 
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service which is declared by a profession as a whole. The public must be given 
reassurance that individual professionals will preserve confidentiality so that the public is 
able to turn to professionals when their services are required. The ability of 
professionals to command high fees is then given as the 'carrot' for the profession to 
conform to a code of conduct which constitutes its ethical basis. This conformity to an 
ethical code is seen to be of benefit to society and maintains the profession's monopoly 
of practice. 
Johnson (1972) criticises the emphasis on process arguing that it deliberately skirts 
around the problem of definition for a theory of profession. One argument is that in order 
to discuss the process of professionalisation it is necessary to indicate the direction of 
the process and the destination towards which an occupation is heading. Confusion is 
also caused by interweaving the intention of defining attributes with reference to 
attributes defined in earlier literature. 
On the assumption that profession could be 'accomplished' independent of the 
definitions proposed by sociologists, Dingwall (1976) has also suggested that rather 
than directing efforts into defining profession, it would be more productive to study 
individuals engaged in particular occupations and the way they use the term 'profession' 
during their routine work day. However this has been criticised on the basis that 
individual members of an occupation cannot avoid individuals' conceptions of profession 
of other occupations with whom they communicate. Also, the state develops 
occupational categories and classifies occupations, the criteria of which influence 
access to a client base, remuneration and status. In other words, interpersonal 
communication and negotiation is not in itself sufficient to achieve profession, nor does 
profession result singularly from individuals in occupations working in a way which 
influences others to treat them as professionals. 
Coming at attribute theories from another angle, Freidson (1989) argues that the 
concept of profession is a folk concept which changes in accordance with who is using 
it and the end to which it is directed. Whilst many definitions include similar or the same 
attributes, little agreement is to be found as to which attributes are to be stressed in 
producing a theory of professions. He criticises the strategy of trying to solve the 
problem of definition by placing less value on defining attributes of professions and 
focusing on the process by which occupations claim or achieve professional status. The 
problem, as Freidson sees it, is that we have no clear direction as to how we can 
determine when professional status is or is not in place; we would still need 
characteristics of professional status to do this. No more helpful is the strategy which 
changes emphasis from an idea of profession being a particular type of occupation to 
the process of professionalisation. He accepts the view of Johnson (1972), and Vollmer 
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and Mills (1966) that focusing on professionalisation rather than the attributes of 
professions still requires us to locate the final destination on the journey of 
professionaiisation. Freidson's insight is to see the problem of définition lying in the 
attempt to treat profession as a generic rather than a dynamic, historical concept. 
As a folk concept, he proposes that the appropriate research strategy is 
phenomenological in nature. What profession is, therefore, is less important than 
describing how we détermine who are Professionals and how they accomplish 
profession by their activities and actions. So différent concepts of profession are put 
forward depending on the goal of the particular group - government agency, 
occupational group, the public and so on. Each group would conceive of profession in a 
way to advance its own political and economic interests. Then the question is which of 
thèse viewpoints is more authoritative. 
Freidson da ims that in order to move on from the folk concept we would need to focus 
more on developing an ail embracing theory of occupations which could be derived from 
describing the character or phenomenon of profession in each particular case rather 
than aiming at généralisation. The purpose of such a theory would be to explain the 
importance of the term 'profession' and to analyse those occupations to which the term 
has been credited. 
Analogous to the comments made by Elliott (1972), Freidson says that our study of each 
case will need to involve an examination of the extent to which da im or aspiration to 
profession influences the organisation of the occupation. 
On the other hand, Johnson (1984) argues that attributing the term 'profession' to an 
occupation refers more to a 'strategy of professionalism' than to the acceptance of an 
autonomous group in the labour market which controls its particular work practices. 
Contemporary professionalism has more to do with an occupational ideology involving 
an attempt to establish status than it has to professionalised work. The strategy of 
professionalism...'more than anything eise, entails a sustained attempt to constitute a 
privileged relationship with the s ta te . . . ' 3 0 (Johnson, 1984: p.20) 
One of the goals of that strategy is associated with the autonomy and extent of 
independence from the state which secures monopolistic practice. For Johnson a 
weakness is exposed in théories which identify the control and use of specialised 
Hère, Johnson applies the term 'professionalisation' to a process which stresses the significance of 
interaction between state and occupational group. Johnson paints a Marxist picture of the state as an 
administrative mechanism producing policy oui of the choices of those who control it. Altematively the state 
can be seen as a System of offices which are distinct from those who occupy them and confer their own 
decision-making powers and liabilities, or, as Rousseau envisaged, a corporate person similar to a firm which 
has its own will, liability and goals. 
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knowledge as a core characteristïc of professions. Whilst it is possible to accept that 
professions do indeed deal with a particutar body of knowledge, this does not explain 
how a profession has corne into a position to exercise control over it. An account of 
specialised knowledge, therefore, would need to involve a description of how control is 
gained and, thereafter, how it is maintained. Such an account would highlight the role of 
the state 3 1 
Fielding and Portwood (1980) also tum their attention to the state but this time through 
their concept of 'bureaucratie profession' which addresses those occupations which 
have reached a stage where a relationship with the state functions to achieve the value-
specific aims of the professions and, at the same time, the pragmatic aim of efficient 
service provision of the state. 
The boundaries of the term 'occupation' need some scrutiny too. Often occupation is 
seen as the principal activity which earns us a living. Occupation, therefore, becomes 
the conceptual mechanism used to analyse the distribution of income. Here, the type of 
activity that we undertake and how it is organised is of less interest than the point that. 
occupations differentiate between levels of income. But occupation cannot be restricted 
to simply pointing to a means of income since if that were so then one could say that 
one's occupation is earning interest from a building society account. An occupation is a 
means of deriving a source of income through the performance of certain skills that 
provide goods or services to the public who, at the same time, acknowledge its value. 
Occupation, at least as we conceive it, is the undertaking of a particular skill or set of 
skills within a division of labour but which involves more than the ability to carry out a 
specialised task. 
However, what is yet to be said is that professions are a product of modem, post-
industrial society which is characterised by a business economy. This brings into 
question whether the compar ions between professions and business can only be 
expressed through the issue of self-interest, and doubts may be raised as to whether 
professionalisation is a process which, above ail else, is to be seen as one of regulatory 
capture. The point has been picked up by Johnson (1995) who, moving from an 
emphasis on occupational analysis, says that in modem societies professions and the 
state carry out both complementary and competing rôles in a process or system of 
ordering and régulation. 
Furthermore, whilst the layman may bow to the expert knowledge of the professional this does not explain 
why the layman should tnjst the professionale competence. 
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Difficulties with définition 
A common method to attempt to arrive at a définition of the nature of profession is to 
select some occupations which, with certainty, we can consider as professions - usually, 
law and medicine - and identify the characteristics which they share to give an ideal 
model against which other occupations may be compared. 
The characteristics which often describe this ideal model are: 
• Expertise, the mastery of which is drawn from an ever developing and complex 
theoretical base which necessarily involves lengthy study and training 
• Authoritative advice, which is related to expertise, and which clients follow without 
knowing why it is good advice 
• A social good at which the expertise is directed and which embraces the needs of 
the individual and the community 
• Autonomy in setting standards of practice, the content of éducation and entry into 
the profession 
• Allegiance expressed through a pledge to follow a code of conduct in which ethical 
guidance is given in relation to client need, the advancement of practice and fellow 
Professionals. 
• Prestige, influence and financial rewards are considered to be greater than in other 
occupations. 
If thèse attributes define what it is for an occupation to be considered a profession then 
at a cursory glance it seems possible to examine ail occupations to see whether they 
can be regarded as professions. But why assume that the two occupations of law and 
medicine are typical professions? Their identified characteristics may point to exceptions 
rather than essentiel attributes and there is nothing amongst those attributes or their 
combination that tell us why they are important. Also, those attributes are unclear in their 
dimensions; how long an éducation or training or how elaborate or specialised a body of 
knowledge? 3 3 
The structure ofthis section relies heavily on the first chapterin Windt, P., Appleby, P. et al (1989) Ethical 
Issues in the Professions. 
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For example, if one of the chteria is a prolonged specialist training in a body of abstract knowledge then a 
five day accréditation course is unlikely to satisfy that criterion ifcompared with occupations where training 
extends to many years. 
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The attribute approach comes across two obstacles. 
Firstly, there is a différence between essential and accidentai attributes. That is to say, 
do ail the listed attributes turn an occupation into a profession, or have some of those 
attributes which have been derived from the model or ideal professions of law and 
mediane, happened by chance and could be changed or even discounted without 
changing an occupations claim to profession? For example, would medicine still be a 
profession if practitioners lost much of their authority? 
The second obstacle lies in confusing descriptive définitions with normative définitions of 
profession. 
A descriptive définition gives attributes that are essential for an occupation to be a 
profession but does not say anything about what professions ought to be like. 
Conversely, a normative définition gives us the ideals that Professionals ought to pursue 
and realise. But it is not always apparent whether we are meant to consider a 
descriptive or normative type of définition. When we are told that those in a profession 
pledge themselves to promoting the well being and interests of their clients, is this given 
in the sensé that a pledge does exist or in the sensé that Professionals ought to have 
such a pledge? 
In relation to debates about professionalisation, problems can also arise where 
accidentai and essential attributes are not determined; problems which are compounded 
by a confusion between descriptive and normative daims. So in a claim by an 
occupation to professional status, do some of the attributes of professions listed give 
rise to other attributes listed? For example, an occupation which has a theoretical 
foundation can argue that this actually gives rise to authority and autonomy. 
Alternative^, it can argue entitlement to it by virtue of having a theoretical foundation. 
The first claim is descriptive, saying that authority and autonomy directly resuit from 
expertise in the context of a social process. The second claim is normative, saying that 
an occupation with a highly developed body of knowledge and expertise ought to have 
authority and autonomy. 
There are difficulties, therefore, in establishing universal characteristics of a profession. 
However, that does not mean that we are prevented from looking further into the ethical 
dimension of professions. 3 4 Here we are addressing the subject of a distinct or special 
ethical status which may or may not be attributable to members of professions. The 
subject may be approached by considering whether there are any occupations -
including those commonly regarded as professions - which have a special ethical status. 
Echoing Freidson (1989). how one décides who Professionals are is govemed to a great extent by the 
purpose of our deciding. 
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If there are none then we are all in the same 'ethical boat'. If, on the other hand, some 
members of occupations are distinguished by special ethical status then the nature of 
that status needs to be examined and a question raised as to why it is held. This does 
not rely on the occupation being a profession and it is possible, therefore, to pursue the 
ethical topics without having to worry about clear distinctions between those 
occupations which are professions and those which are not. And if that is not the case, 
then we are still open to the possibility of trying to see how an occupation could get 
special ethical status. 
Again there is a distinction to be drawn between descriptive and normative issues. From 
a descriptive point of view, ethical status refers to one's location in the actual system of 
values that is to be found in one's society and will be influenced by how restricted or 
expansive a view one intends to put on the term society. From a normative point of view, 
ethical status refers to the whole framework of values and principles that should inform 
one's conduct and that should give rise to the judgement of one's character. 
Is it possible, then, for different people to have different normative ethical status? 3 5 
Before addressing this question we need to comment on ethical roles. 
Ethical roles 
Identifying the particular function or position of persons is the first of three points which 
need to be addressed when attempting to define an ethical role. Next, the ethical status 
of those in the identified role must be found to differ from the ethical status of those not 
in the role. This means finding some derivative or fundamental value or values that 
correspond in the same manner to everyone in the identified role but not to anyone not 
in the role. Finally, the ethical status which is particular to the role must be reliant upon 
the features which define the role. 
Three considerations have been employed in arguments against diversity in normative ethical status; 
universalisability, equality and ethical harmony.The first of these broadly gives that if we make different 
normative ethical judgements about two situations then we must be capable of identifying some ethically 
relevant characteristics which are to be found in one but not in the other situation. Essentially this is a 
requirement for consistency but leaves open the question of what types of differences are to be construed as 
ethically relevant. 
The second consideration, equality, is a generally accepted principle that in a just society the sharing of 
advantages and disadvantages should be as equitable as possible. Thus if we wanted to say that 
professionals did in fact have a normative ethical status which was different from that of non-professionals, 
then it would be necessary for us to show that we are not arguing for some form of inequity that would give 
rise to an accusation of being unjust. 
Thirdly, ethical harmony refers to a widely held view that if we were all in a position to understand our rights 
and duties then our actions would be congruent with each other. An opposing view would be that our actual 
rights and obligations can arise under conditions that lead to conflict. So the greater the diversity in ethical 
status the more prone we are to ethical disharmony. 
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So are there professional ethical roles? More specifically, are there any occupations, the 
defining features of which give rise to more discernible ethical roles for any person in 
one of those occupations? 
Responses to this question vary. At one end there are those who argue that 
professionals are no different to anyone else and, therefore, their conduct and actions 
should be considered in terms of the same ethical values. At the other end there are 
those who say that being a professional is so different that the ethical status of 
professionals is distinct from that of non-professionals. This includes those who claim 
that entry into a profession should be seen as a submission to a calling which 
transforms them into people with very different ethical status and places them one rung 
higher on the 'ethical ladder.' 
The middle ground in the arguments of ethical roles of professions centres around 
derivative-level distinctions between the ethical status of professionals and non­
professionals, The main endeavour is to give characteristics that can be employed to 
substantiate distinct role values taken from the shared core values of other professions 
and non-professions. Much depends on the fundamental values or theoretical ethical 
perspective adopted, so we have to give at least a glimpse of the three major 
approaches to ethical theory together with some of the difficulties which each brings. 
The approaches have been traditionally classified under the headings of 
consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics, although under the last of these 
approaches the classification is seen to be one of a distinction between duty ethics and 
agent ethics. For the moment the traditional format and classification is followed in order 
to suggest a more accessible vantage point from which to look at occupations and the 
ethical framework in which they operate. 
FAMILIES OF ETHICAL THEORY AND APPROACHES TO THE PROFESSIONS 
Consequentialist approaches: Utilitarianism 
Consequentialist approaches focus on the outcome of consequences of human actions 
which are judged in accordance with the level of desirable results those actions 
accomplish. Here, concepts of duty, right and wrong wait upon the concept of the 
intention of an action. The most common of the two consequentialist theories, 
utilitarianism, considers the optimum good in relation to society as a whole. 3 6 
Jeremy Bentham, to whom the term is credited, conceives of the principle of utility as 
the balance in favour of happiness over unhappiness evaluated in terms of alternative 
actions. The idea is taken further by John Stuart Mill who argues that the only proof for 
The other theory, which has had marginal support, takes an action to be right if it benefits the individual (in 
the Tirst person sense) the most or is the least harmful, after taking into account all possible alternative actions. 
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the destrability of something is that someone desires it and that because everyone 
desires happiness or pleasure then the most désirable thing is happiness. The aim of 
morality, therefore, is to secure the greatest happiness for the maximum number of 
people. 
Mills' conception relates good to happiness or pleasure. Another view, however, is that 
maximising happiness as maximising good is not sufficient. What about maximising 
other goods such as knowledge, friendship or care, for example? A claim could be made 
that thèse goods also bring pleasure but it would be more difficult to claim that their 
goodness could be reduced to the pleasure which they may bring. 
How, then, does one apply the Principle of Utility? 
To start with, each person must be counted as one and all considérations of race, creed 
and custom must be jettisoned. In assessing happiness, future as well as présent 
générations must be considered. And, finally, happiness must be assessed in totality in 
Order to avoid reducing utilitarianism to a theory that suggests that one ought to do what 
makes most persons happy; the aim is to maximise happiness irrespective of whose it 
is. 
Contemporary utilitarians apply the principle of Utility in one of two ways. Act utilitarians 
believe that it should be applied to measure the outcome of each individual action 
against how much good is achieved. Rule utilitarians, however, believe that it should be 
applied to measure the conséquences of adopting a gênerai rule which is marked out by 
a specific action. 
There are a number of problems encountered in utilitarianism. 
In holding that each person's happiness counts for one in the total score and that the 
aim is to promote happiness, regardless of whose it is, it is not clear why we should do 
this. Is this something that we actually want, we ought to want, or is it something 
reasonable to want? And given that utilitarianism focuses on the conséquences of an 
action for a majority, the principle of utility lays ground to injustice to a mînority. No 
reasons are given to explain the authority to override the happiness of one person in 
favour of a majority. Therefore, a major criticism which can be levied against 
utilitarianism is that it gives us no account of justice. 
From a utilitarian standpoint a profession may be considered in terms of the good it is 
able to promote and the harm it is able to prevent. Here, special rights and duties will be 
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attributed to Professionals if it is thought that it will end in more good than or less harm 
than other compelling duties. 
Deontology: Kant 
Should, as the deontoligists maintain, ethics not concern itself with the rules and 
principles we employ to guide or constrain our actions instead of focusing on the 
conséquences of actions? 
Kant believed that moral judgements are imperatives, rationally motivated and universal. 
For Kant the only good is an action of the will motivated for the right reasons, and it is 
the exercise of reason which helps us to discover correct moral precepts. Actions which 
resuit on this basis are those done from duty. 
A good and free act of the will, then, is one done not through inclination or passion but 
one which has the right reasons for doing it. Actions are good not because of the 
conséquences which may follow but are good because they are the right thing to do. 
This, however, does not tell us anything about how we should know what our duty is. 
Kant's response to this is to daim that duty is acting with respect for other rational 
beings which runs together with the idea of universal principles that should govern ail 
our actions. But what of a principle which governs all persons? Kant puis forward the 
principle of the categorical imperative which is expressed through three formulae. 
To begin with, the categorical imperative gives that we find our reasons for acting only 
after ail contingent realities have been set aside. If this imperative is followed, then we 
will only be doing what reason requires and will not be subject to individual inclinations 
and interests. This binds all rational beings : act only on the maxim which you can will as 
a law for all rational beings. 
The demand for reason is at the same time a demand that we respect reason not only in 
ourselves but in everyone eise. In the course of engaging our individual pursuits, we 
must persuade others of our actions and cannot veto or override the reason of others as 
though it were worthless. To do this would be to use others as only a means to our 
purposes: act so as to treat rational beings always as ends in themselves and never as 
means only. In a contemporary light the categorical imperative may be seen not only as 
a principle binding the individual will but may also be seen as a an instrument of 
negotiation within a System of 'side constraints'. That is, a moral law which does not tell 
us what to do but what we cannot do. 
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Not only are we bound to respect other rational beings but we are also bound to find 
reasons for justifying our actions to others. In this sensé we are led to the idea of an 
ideal Community in which all rights are respected and all duties met: act so that the 
maxim of your actions might become a law of nature in a kingdom ofends. 
Weaknesses of Kant's approach may be highlighted by asking whether reason alone is 
sufficient to provide a motive to action and whether it is not possible that someone could 
mistakenly believe a morally abhorrent rule that the world should live by. 
An alternative deontological outlook centres on the principles that govern society as a 
whole rather than the actions of individuals; the aim being to attempt to establish 
universal principles of justice. This is best captured between the approaches of the 
seventeenth Century philosopher John Locke, who argues from a natural rights position, 
and the contemporary philosopher John Rawls who develops his argument from a 
'reasonable* person position. 3 7 
Deontology: contractarian approaches 
Locke asks us to engage in a thought experiment in which we imagine a world which 
has no laws, social norms or government and in which rational beings come together to 
détermine ethical principles for all social and political communities. These principles are 
analogous to those of the categorical imperative in that all rational beings would agree 
such principles and would hold universally. Locke maintains that every person is born 
into the world endowed with natural rights which are innately human and cannot be 
taken away. When our imagined rational beings come together to détermine principles, 
they formulate a social contract that forms the basis for an agreement between 
themselves and their government where natural rights are protected. Rights, therefore, 
are the deontological precepts which are used to construct and judge all social, political 
and economic life in their rules and governance. 
Like Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau used the social contract as the foundation for their political philosophy. 
Hobbes believed that a contract must be enforceable to be of any value. Enforcement, therefore, must come 
with the deal. Rational beings would enter a contract to establish a sovereign (single person, pariiament) who 
would have absolute authority to enforce the terms of the agreement. The sovereign, as a création of the 
social contract, could not be party to it and is able, therefore, to disregard its terms as long as the terms are 
enforced against all others. For Hobbes, the sovereign acts as the enforcer of a System of laws to which 
obédience is the cost of membership. Obédience is exchanged for the benefits ofcivic peace. 
For Rousseau, human beings are both good and free by nature. They become bad to the extent that their 
freedom is diminished and the cause of their diminishing freedom is institutions. These can enhance freedom 
only if démocratie. In surrendering to this arrangement the citizen chooses to be overridden by the rest of the 
Community but the surrender is also an enhancement. 
Like Hobbes, Rousseau's contract créâtes a new corporate entüy with its own personality. When consiüered 
as passive it is called the State when active it is called the sovereign. Contrary to Locke, Rousseau rejected 
natural rights. 
Common to all forms of the social contract is the phnciple that our obligations are setf-made and self-
imposed. 
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Rawls (1971), on the other hand, asks which principles of justice would rational Oeings 
conceive if a 'veil of ignorance' was drawn across social reality. He asks us to enter a 
hypothetical world where we do not know the social characteristics and facts that 
distinguish us from others. Rawls maintains that people would have to formulate 
principles that are fair to everyone since they are not in a position to predict which 
principles, if chosen, would favour them individually. 
However, the main objection to Rawls' argument is that from behind the veil of 
ignorance are we not also discounting conceptions of the good and values that really 
make rational choice possible? The social contract approach of Rawls is similar to that 
of Kant's deontology in that like Kant, Rawls tries to reach a rational motive by taking 
away all real motives. But again, is it reason alone that motivâtes us? 
Professional ethical rôles from a deontological outlook may give rise to a number of 
différent approaches. If the focus is on individual freedom, then the picture of a 
professional person may be paînted as no more than a citizen who, in a capitalisme 
society, is free to choose an occupation and similarly free to choose clients and 
conditions of practice. In such an approach the rights and obligations of the professional 
are no différent to those of the private individual. If the emphasîs is on the rights of those 
requiring professional service then Professionals may have special obligations attached. 
Alternative^, if the focus is on duties rather than rights, then contractarian approaches 
to professional ethics may be formulated. One argument may be that on entering 
professions, Professionals commit themselves to special responsibilities from which 
follows that the fundamental obligation to fulfîll one's agreements gives rise to special 
duties for everyone in those professions. Such an argument seems crédible given the 
existence of professional codes of conduet and the pursuit of common standards of 
practice within a profession. 3 8 
However, contractarian approaches leave open to dispute that even if we were able to 
uncover what the Professionals rôle should be in an ideal society (under the veil of 
social ignorance), how can we be certain that the same professional rôle would be 
appropriate for the society we actually find ourselves in? 
Another deontological account may give that Professionals have obligations to the public 
on the basis that their training has corne about through the support of government 
policies and the public purse which also establishes the institutions in which 
As is the case with commercial médiation practitioners. 
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Professionals* éducation takes place. Professionals, therefore, are indebted to the public 
for their nascence and pursue a rôle whose parameters are set by public will. 
Virtue Ethics 
The traditional antithesis between deontology and utilitarianism has prompted a différent 
approach to ethics according to which the basic judgements in ethics are judgements 
about character. 3 9 This approach encompasses two principal arguments; firstly, that at 
least some judgements about the value of dispositions to character are independent of 
judgements about the rightness or wrongness of actions and, secondly, that the idea of 
virtue justifies the idea of right conduct. These arguments run contrary to a populär view 
of the relationship between virtue and rightness, shared by deontologists and utiiitarians 
alike, in which the value of character traits relies upon the value of the conduct that 
thèse traits are seen to produce; the concept of right behaviour comes before the 
concept of v i r tue. 4 0 
The distinction between virtue ethics and non-virtue ethics théories can be summarised 
in relation to describing human action as having three features: 
(1) that it is a specific event (2) carried out by an agent and (3) that it has determinative 
conséquences. 
Each of these features can generally be seen to comprise the objects of moral 
évaluation and judgement. So each différent type of theory can be identified by the 
feature that it takes to be the primary object of moral évaluation. Deontological théories 
place emphasis on the évaluation of the act, virtue ethics théories emphasise the 
évaluation of the character of the agent and consequentialist théories evaluate the 
outcome of the act, 
Virtue ethics reverses the idea that the judgement of the rightness or wrongness of 
actions (deontic judgements) is prior to judgements about character (aretaic 
judgements). The degree to which this idea is taken differs amongst proponents of virtue 
ethics. Middle-ground approaches maintain that whilst judgements of character are 
Prior to Anscombe (1958) normative ethical theory consistée! primarily of the two traditions of deontological 
and consequentialist ethics. According to the former, morality is based on the moral law the features of which 
are that it is universal. The same features are found in consequentialism which compels us to maximise utitity. 
Anscombe's view was that because most people no longer believed in God, it is necessary to set aside 
legalistic moral language and locate morality firmly in the notion of virtue. To achieve this, Anscombe argued 
that it was necessary to pursue a much more developed moral psychology. 
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Virtue ethics as an agent oriented ethical theory is more personal than utilitarian or consequentialist 
théories in as much as the latter consider what is good for society as a whole rather than what sort of person 
one should be. 
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independent of judgements of actions, some judgements of acts are similarly 
independent of judgements of character (Slote 1992). Other versions give that there are 
no judgements of acts which are independent of judgements of virtue. Such versions 
range from reductionist da ims that we can use deontic concepts of right and duty as 
long as we keep in mind that they are derivative of aretaic concepts, to those da ims that 
we should banish deontic concepts completely (Anscombe 1981, Maclntyre 1985). 
Proponents of virtue ethics most commonly cite Aristotle to support their arguments and 
présent Kant as the Chief adversary. However, the Aristotle versus Kant approach has 
been over stated and work by contemporary virtue ethics theorists shows that the 
différence between the two is less marked. This is indicative of a view that ethical 
théories resemble each other more than they differ. 
The framework of virtue ethics offers two principal alternatives: an ethics of virtue or an 
ethics of duty (which addresses ail non-virtue ethics approaches including utilitarianism 
and Kantian deontology). Contrary to the traditional classification presented in this 
paper, deontology and utilitarianism do have certain features in common; that ail people 
are bound by some universal duties; that moral reasoning is restricted to the application 
of principles and that the value of virtue is derived from the concept of right or good. Ail 
thèse features are contested by virtue ethics. 
A virtue ethics approach to professions may not recognise professional rôle distinctions 
if it is thought that there is an ideal human nature to which every virtuous person should 
aspire and achieve. However, it may be held that if it is possible to have différent 
(normatively) valid ideals and, in particular, if those ideals can be defined by an act of 
commitment, then there may be a distinction between the virtuous professional and the 
virtuous layperson. The kind of commitments which Professionals make can also differ. 
For example, in the case of a commitment to client service, the virtuous professional will 
be the one who is pre-eminent in satisfying the needs of clients, or society. Or, perhaps, 
a commitment is made to excellence in the skills that the professional utilises in the 
course of practice. Consequently the nature of the commitment may point to whether its 
pursuit is an act of professional virtue or not. 
ETHICAL STATUS 
Professions, business and trust 
The conduct of Professionals and the standards which they lay down are the subject of 
ethical debate which tries to steer a path between the values expressed in the 
émergence and existence of the profession itself and those of the prevailing economic 
and political climate which includes the clientèle the profession serves or aims to 
secure. In attempting to reconcile thèse factors, we return to the question of ethical 
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status and the extent to which it differs between the professional person and the non­
professional person, and whether the aim of a profession and the conduct of 
professionals within that profession are ethically acceptable. The latter leads to 
considering what ethical principles should guide the professional's relationships with 
clients and how they are different from non-professionals. Attempts, therefore, have 
been made to find if the values of professions differ from those of business and whether 
the aims of both are compatible. 
Pritchard (1997), following a deontological line, holds the view that acting ethically is 
fundamental to professional life since a profession, above all else, wishes to use its 
knowledge for the public good. She starts by saying that unlike the provision of service 
which is seen as the basis for the relationship between professional and client, the 
relationship between business and customer is characterised by the supply of goods. 4 1 
Customers become purchasers because they want certain products of business 
whereas people become clients because they desire a particular good such as spiritual 
redemption, health or justice. Trust is seen as the overriding factor in the relationship 
between client and professional. This is attached to the idea that a professional makes a 
public promise to serve people who have a particular need of a particular good; for 
example, the sick have a desire for health. 
But a customer, too, has some need that a business can provide. Payment does not 
appear to be the critical factor since a client pays for the services of a professional in the 
same way that a customer pays for goods from a supplier or manufacturer. 
The success of a professional in carrying out his or her job is not evaluated solely on the 
basis of expertise but must be evaluated within an ethical framework. The term 
'professional', then, carries with it an ethical undertaking so that to act unprofessionally 
is to act unethically. 
Business can also act ethically or unethically but saying that it does or does not has no 
bearing on whether the business is good in terms of the success with which it makes 
profit. For example, an appeal to a businessperson that he or she has a duty to protect 
the environment is misapplied. Unless laws restrict the ways by which business makes 
profit, we can only make appeals of this nature on the basis that a particular duty 
applies to all people. So the values under which business operate are not the same as 
Pritchard qualifías the term 'service' by referring to the increase of occupations in ancillary health care, 
management and human resources, claiming professional status which has run concurrently with the general 
increase in the service industries, hiere the term 'service' is applied to distinguish services from manufacturing 
or supply. She does not deny that those in the service industries have expertise but Claims they are not 
Professionals. 
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those of professionals. If a business does opérate under some sort of ethical umbrella 
then this is a matter of choice for the business and of no option for the professional. The 
Professional offers a service of valué to society as a whole and, in that respect, there is 
a relationship between the public and the professional. 
Market valúes and trust 
A different picture of ethical relationships has been articulated by Fukuyama (1999) 
through the concept of social capital. 
In his discussion on the deterioration of social order in western societies, Fukuyama 
characterises modern post-industrial society as the development of an 'information 
society' propelled by technological advance and change coupled with a culture of 
individualism. 
Fukuyama sees a tensión in western society between seeking to widen individual 
freedom and the continual reformulation of rules needed for co-operative behaviour 
which curtails the extent of individual freedom. This continual reformulation promotes 
increasing fragmentation and disorder in society which is less able to implement 
common goals. If we accept that society needs rules then we need to address the 
question, whose rules? This question, though, is difficult to square with a culture in 
which tolerance is seen as a great plus and any attempt to decide matters by one's own 
ethical perspective or cultural norms is seen as a minus. We are left, then, with the 
problem of cultural relativism which Fukuyama confronts by focusing on social capital 
which he defines as 'a set of informal valúes or norms shared among members of a 
group that permits co-operation among them.' 4 2 However, the sharing of valúes and 
norms on its own, does not guarantee the production of social capital since the valúes 
being shared may be wrong in the first place. 
If all members of a group behave honestly and reliably with each other then they will 
eventually begin to trust one another. Trust, therefore, is the stuff which makes for the 
effective management of a group, albeit effective groups can be formed where there is 
no social capital by the use of contracts and legal systems. The difference between 
these formal mechanisms and the informal norms said to be at the heart of social capital 
is that there is a far greater cost involved in the monitoring and administration of the 
former. 
Cultural relativism is the belief that cultural rules are unrelated social constructs of different societies (or 
groups within them) and that there are neither ethical principies which are universaliy applicable nor any 
means by which to judge the norms and valúes of other cultures. Essentially it is a reaction against Western 
ralionalism. 
Fukuyama's general thesis is that humans have a natural predisposition to society; co-operative behaviour has 
a basis in human genetics and is not culturally constructed on its own. 
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Social capital, therefore, is seen to be fundamental to civil society; that is, all those 
groups and inter-relationships that are to be found between the famlly and the State. 
Despite the fact that it is possible for social capital to be directed towards bad ends, it is 
widely held that to have social capital is a positive attribute of civil society. 
Fukuyama then discusses the changes in norms and values under the thème of 
increasing individualism. He describes traditional society as one in which individual 
choice is substantially restricted, and social obligations, through the bonds of family, 
religion and social class, are prévalent. This is in contrast to modern societies where 
individual choice is pursued at the expense of the ties of social obligation. In modern 
society we relate and connect more with those who we choose rather than being 
connected by involuntary or inherited ties. The effect of this is that the loosening of ties 
and obligations is not limited to those associated with traditional societies but moves on 
to unravel and undermine the social ties that underpin voluntary institutions which 
inhabit modern societies. Under such circumstances the authority of many institutions 
and groups is challenged {including government and Professionals). The issue of trust, 
both public and private, is, therefore, crucial. 
Turning to social capital in terms of capitalist economy and ethics, Fukuyama rallies 
against the idea that capitalism is detrimental to moral life and is inherently self-
destructive because of its 'bottom line' mentality. His argument is built upon identifying a 
confusion which results from linking social capital to public good from which it 
mistakenly follows that social capital is not effectively produced by the free market of 
capitalist économies. In other words, social capital is seen as a positive value to society, 
leaving no possibility for individuals to reap the benefits of social capital which they 
embody and, as a conséquence, have no motivation to create. So it is left to non-market 
forces by either state intervention, particularly through a public éducation System which 
is provided as a public good, or non-government groups like families, the church and 
generally ail voluntary organisations that do not have a financial goa l . 4 3 
To the contrary Fukuyama says that social capital will be produced by private markets 
because it is in the long-term self-interest of individuals to produce it. Though the end 
resuit may not appear to be that différent, the point is not to confuse altruism, which 
values action for its own sake, with long-term rational self-interest which strives to gain a 
réputation for values such as honesty, reliability and quality. This thought is elaborated 
in a comparison between market exchange (a transaction carried out for the mutual 
On the basis that professional firms generally do not manage their professional staff through bureaucratic 
ntles and Standard procedures, professional education is seen as a major source of social capital in any 
advanced Information society. 
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benefit of buyer and seller), and reciprocal altruism (which also involves an exchange of 
benefits). 
Why, then, is market exchange thought of as an amoral transaction whereas reciprocity 
is endowed with 'moral weight'? 
The only distinction to be found is in the timing of the exchange. In a market transaction 
the exchange takes place concurrently, and in the case of reciprocal altruism, one party 
may confer a benefit to another without the prospect or certainty of any immediate 
benefit in return. Whilst market exchange is not reciprocal altruism, that does not mean 
they have no relationship. For Fukuyama, reciprocity is fostered by market exchange 
which extends from the economic into the moral world in which the self-interest of those 
who engage in it is fostered by moral exchange. 
Fukuyama concludes that the discussion of ethical relationships in modern capitalist 
societies should not revolve around the character of economic exchange itself but, 
instead, devote attention to the subject of increasing change and uncertainty. This 
conclusion partly reflects what Adam Smith had pointed to in relation to the significance *t 
of trust in the professions where their ethical status was seen to align with the expertise 
required of professional services in order to deal with the uncertainty and changing 
nature of professional work. Trust and expertise were key to the market sector which 
professions occupied. 
Fukuyama's conclusion can be associated with the idea that trust is a key feature of our > 
management of risk in modern society and that patterns of trust develop to deal with the 
risks of a particular age and place (Giddens, 1990, 1991). In modern society tradition 
has been replaced by faith in the value of change and the interpersonal nature of 
traditional communities has been displaced by the increasing dominance of abstract 
systems, especially electronic processes. In pre-modern society, the trust that was 
vested in priests and local wise people, who were seen as the guardians of tradition, 
has now been replaced by trust in expert systems; that is, trust in institutions. So in a 
society which no longer has the certainty and security of tradition, its functioning and 
maintenance relies on advice by experts. In this sense, a profession can be seen to 
function as a sort of global risk manager. 
Virtue, role identity and responsibility: three converging concepts in developing 
ethical perception 
Between them, Fukuyama's and Pritchard's arguments highlight the problems which 
arise when setting up an antithesis between profits and social good. These problems 
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are associated with the focus of the study of professions and how the Substantive ethical 
theories actually contribute to the formation of professional identity. 
Allegedly, professions have a greater ethical responsibility which sets them apart from 
other occupations from which has followed a generic distinction between business and 
professions. Little, however, is left for the individual practitioner with which to engage in 
terms of developing ethical perception other than reliance on an ethical code to evaluate 
moral concerns and decisions. 4 4 This touches on the point that as a feature of 
professionalisation, the expectation of following a profession's ethical rules seems to be 
based on certain assumptions; that the work of a professional is different to the work of 
other occupations; that the accepted practices of a profession can be laid down in a set 
of rules that can be used as the basis of sanctions against transgressors; and that a set 
of rules conveys a sense of professionalism that gives moral grounding to the practices 
carried out in the name of the profession. But can a set of rules form the basis for 
development in professional ethics and can such rules guide a professional's sense of 
professionalism and sense of personal responsibility within a Community of 
Professionals? 4 5 Moreover, moral education in the professions which relies heavily on 
the study of codes of ethics could contribute to a narrow view of professional and 
business life; their study being more relevant to the discovery of the moral assumptions 
which are articulated by the professional group. 
Hughes (1928) says that one side-effect of professional training is that the candidate 
takes on board a: 
'professional conscience and solidarity. The profession Claims and aims to 
become a moral unit' (Hughes, 1928: p.762). 
Hughes uses the notions of secular and sacred to describe different divisions of labour 
and to suggest that in certain occupations the process of sanctification takes place. This 
process involves a dependency upon bureaucratic Status and pre-occupation with 
issues of competence, expertise and authority from which arises moral legitimisation. In 
Ethical perception is taken to mean the capacity to recognise an ethical issue in a complex situation which 
is as important as ethical reasoning in considering practical ethical problems. The ethical imperative of 
competence. demanded by professions themselves, the market or government, ignores this, and appears to 
be solely concemed with expertise in a particular area of knowledge. 
Ethical perception should also be distinguished from applied ethics. There is no science of morality which is 
applied to practical decision-making in the way that the science of physics can be applied to engineering 
Problems. The term 'applied ethics' suggests that answers to ethical problems may be arrived at when the 
particular case is considered to fall under a gênerai moral rule or set of rules. But the idea of 'moral expertise, ' 
if it can be called that, does not ahse from having specialised knowledge but from having a highly tuned sense 
of moral imagination. 
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At the same time, professional work involves some sort of moral anchor which is not limited to a code of 
practica or code of ethics but also arises in respect of knowing what to do since no code can prépare a 
professional person for every eventuatity. Hence the importance of developing ethical perception. 
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a search for identity, this, more than anything eise, contributes to the standing of 
Professionals. If we were able to transport the Hughes of seventy-five years ago to the 
présent day, he might be describing the problem rather than the end resuit. 
The practical aim of understanding the ethical dimension of emerging and established 
professions could devote itself more to finding a greater intégration of professional and 
business rôles rather than formulating and refining distinctions between them. This 
would not undermine the importance of the social good, traditionally associated with 
professional motivation, but would avoid reducing the discussion on the rôles of 
professions and business to the well-worn oppositions of self and shared interest and 
that of profit and social g o o d . 4 6 It would also acknowledge that: 
'...moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberatefy do not write 
"because social life changes," for this might suggest that sociai life is one thing, 
morality another, and that there is mereiy an external, contingent causal 
relationship between them. This is obviously false. Moral concepts are 
embodied in and are partially constitutive of forms of social life. One key way in 
which we may identify one form of social life as distinct from another is by 
identifying différences in moral concepts' (Maclntyre, 1971: p.1). 
Professions and business may have their own particular aims and practices but that 
does not mean that the ethical dimension of each is mutually exclusive. Key is how we 
conceive of trust in the professions as a primary élément of social functioning. Although 
Fukuyama examines trust in the context of business, he reminds us of a point that 
Pritchard forgets, which is that trust is a 'by-product' of human interactions. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that in Pritchard's passionless account of professions and 
business, words like reliability, modesty, loyalty, non-vindictiveness, wittiness, 
toughness, courage and so on do not feature; words which we understand as the virtues 
and which describe the subtleties of personal dispositions that serve human interactions 
and signify the rôles and responsibilities associated with those dispositions in différent 
contexts.47 In turn, this appears to do with the lack of identifying the particular meanings 
of trust which may be attributed to particular rôles. 4 8 
This remains congruent with Johnson's view that greater insîght into professions is to be gained if attention 
is moved away from attempting to examine occupations ' pursuit of self-interest to examining the conditions 
under which professions émerge. 
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For example, toughness, like most virtues cannot be reduced to self-interestedness but neither can it be an 
altruistic trait of character. Toughness is a virtue but caltousness is not. Toughness means being persistent 
and having confidence of vision but does not mean indifférence or treading on other people. Toughness can 
cède to another virtue (Solomon, 1997). 
This also has significance in relation to corporate personality. 
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4 WHAT DO W E MEAN WHEN W E S A Y TRUST? 
Social capital and avoiding the commoditisation of trust 
Social capital has emerged as a dominant concept in the understanding of modern 
society. Perhaps as a reaction against individualism and an increasing alertness to 
globalisation, the concept has been used as a vehicle to attempt to put back the 'social* 
into capitalism. 
In discussing how economics has colonised other fields of study, Fine (2001) makes an 
uncompromising attack on those non-economists who have taken on board the concept 
of social capital and have done nothing to enhance greater understanding of their own 
disciplines. 4 9 Fine does not say that social capital should be banished from the realm of 
other disciplines but believes that the concept had other avenues to go down before 
being used against other social sciences. Although this colonisation by economics is not 
our concern here, it leads to the point that one of those unexplored avenues is to pay 
attention to identity as a way of reintroducing a 'sociological slant' to the concept of 
social capital (Fevre, 2000). It also exposes how Fukuyama looks at trust. 
Fukuyama is interested in the rules which facilitate social order rather than self-
organisation. He believes that social order has been destroyed and reconstructed 
throughout history. In the same way that the industrial revolution led to the creative 
destruction of social capital, the information society, propelled by technological 
innovation over the second half of the twentieth century, has led to disruption. He 
argues that this process of destruction and reconstruction is a prerequisite to economic 
prosperity. But how can we be certain that social capital will always be reconstituted in 
the form demanded by new times? Fukuyama's answer to this question provides our 
point of departure; he says that humans are biologically predisposed to society and that 
cooperative behaviour, therefore, is not independently constructed by culture. In 
Fukuyama's socio-biological emphasis, history has no role to play and, as such, 
provides Fine an exemplary instance of economic rationalism and the 'imperialism of 
economics.' 
In contrast to Fukuyama, we are trying to look at the way social capital can serve to 
enhance our understanding of professional work and trust which is not ahistorical, and 
For example, referring to the work of Coleman (1988). social capital is simply the extension of economics to 
address 'the handling of mannet imperfections and public goods/bads' (Fine, 2001: p. 76). Fine continues to 
accuse Coleman of turning social exchange theory - which looks at how social relations, norms and all social 
structures are tobe understood in terms of behaviour, and the appropriate types of individual behaviour or 
motivation which we should address - into social capital theory by ' the primitive appropriation of economics' 
(Fine, 2001: p.79). 
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refers to the 'person' rather than the 'human'. Key to this approach appears to be 
identity; 5 0 a mechanism which enables individuáis to put social capital into effect: 
'Instead of putting our faith in the infinite renewal of social capital which is 
supposedly guaranteed by human biology, we should be thinking hard about 
where our aspirations to social identities are being produced if they are no 
longer being created as part of the process which produces social capital1 
{Fevre, 2000: p.106). 
Applying the point which Fevre makes to our discussion of professionals means that if 
we see social capital and trust as not being context contingent, then professionals are 
seen as no more than commodities or 'characters' in the market with neither individual 
identity, motivation, nor désire for self-organisation. Identity, therefore, turns into 
commodity together with social capital. And with it trust moves from being at least a 
désirable social feature, or even a moral good as Hirschman (1984) sees it,5 1 to being a 
commodity. We can contrast this what Giddens says about trust. 
Professions, social reflexivity and self-interest 
Giddens (1990,1991) believes that in modem society tradition has given way to faith in 
change and that abstract Systems are increasingly replacing personal interaction in 
traditional communities. More and more personal trust is being transferred to expert 
Systems embodied in institutions or professions. He discusses three phenomena in his 
examination of trust in institutions and their management of risk in modem society; 
human violence derived from industrialised war, social reflexivity, and personal 
meaninglessness arising out of personal reflexivity. It is the second and third of thèse 
phenomena which are of relevance here. 
The process of social reflexivity forces society to face up to the unintentional effects of 
modem society. 5 2 This process is experienced in three ways; firstly, through the threat to 
society's natural and cultural underpinnings as a conséquence of its own developments 
and activities; secondly, through the threat of having to redirect its resources into the 
process of confronting the threat itself; and, finally, the trust which society has in its own 
Unlike pre-capitalist societies where identity was predominantly given through family, religion and local 
Community, in industrial capitalist societies identity derived from work became increasingly important 
5 1 Hirschman sees trust as a moral good in that unlike economic commodities. trust increases with use and 
decreases wilh disuse. 
5 2 The process of social reflexivity is différent to the reflective processes used to examine thèse effects as 
soon as they are identified. One obvious example is car pollution. At fîrst, toxic émissions produced by cars 
and other vehicles are seen as something no more than unattractive. But añer a while thèse émissions begin 
to have an impact on the structures of society; forests are lost due to acid rain, buildings decay and health 
suffers because of the greater prevalence of respiratory disease. The social acth/ity of transportation now has 
negative side effects both on the ecológica! System and on society. 
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structures is constantly having to face up to the negative effects of critical functions such 
as manufacturing and transport. The same process is at piay at individual levé). 
Where protection of society is no longer to be found in the security of tradition and local 
Community, we find ourselves influenced by experts who advise us on subjects as 
diverse as psychiatry, learning leadership skills and developing stratégies for dealing 
with emotional conflict. So as individuals we locate ourselves and our normality within 
expert Systems against which we can measure our adequacy. We have adapted to the 
concept of reflexivity to manage change and uncertainty, replacing pre-modern society's 
assumption of individual stability in a community. In this way the components of 
personal identity are susceptible to the same instability and érosion of meaning to be 
found in the trust and security of the structures of society. 
One weakness in what Giddens says is that in believing that the prominent feature of 
the self in modem society is its reflexivity, he also believes that this is a tangible process 
in which the individual has real control in this constant reconstruction of his or her self 
(Craib, 1998: p.2). 
What impact, then, does this have on professions and professional rôles? The current 
perception of professions is that they are increasingly promoting their own self-interest. 
Perhaps it is an unavoidable conséquence of market ideotogy and the widening spread 
of capitalism that professions will become more and more concerned with self-interest. 
But this is not the only view of professions. There is also the idea of a profession as a 
group of independent individuals with a particular expertise dedicated to the service of 
the community who are able to agrée to regulate their practice through a code of ethics. 
But the picture of a profession drawn here is not the picture of an institution of the free 
market. It is an organisation in which individuals organise their lives and acts as a bridge 
between the individual and the state as part of what was once understood as 'civil 
society' {Craib, 1998: p.59). It is difficult to deny that both views of a profession contain 
degrees of truth, but a profession cannot be seen as one thing. Nor should we expect 
that individual members of a profession are motivated in the same way and to the same 
degree. 
Giddens would say that trust has moved from the local to the abstract. Trust in the local 
practitioner has been transferred to trust in the profession as an expert System which is 
subject to a degree of distrust. But businesses (that is ail those occupations that are 
considered not to be professions) can also daim that they pay attention to the 
development of trust in their products or services. So are we able to arrive at meanings 
of trust that are specifically attributable to professions? What we are missing from 
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Giddens' account of social reflexivity is a fuller description of the dimensions of trust in 
its modern State. 5 3 
Classifying trust 
One approach to examining thèse dimensions is to see how the term 'trust' is used in 
everyday speech and look at its linguistic properties and integrity. What follows in this 
section is an adaptation and extension of the work of Little and Fearnside (2000). Using 
their examples, occasionally with some minor changes, we begin to see how trust is 
unstable in nature and how the security of trust as the basis of modern professional 
relationships is problematic. 
1 / am a trusting person, 
Used as a term to describe personhood, the word indicates that we may be predisposed 
to the act of trusting through acquired attitudes of mind. 
2 Trust in God. 
Here there is a call to faith in the sensé of a trust in infallibility. Trust as faith is not 
limited to religious contexts. This may émerge as faith, say, in a patriotic cause. As an 
article of faith, it supports the System from which it is constructed. Therefore, without an 
article of faith, the System cannot be sustained. Typically, this is an area where the 
world of religion and the world of science collide; where an attack on the System of the 
faithful by science is defended on the basis that 'thèse things have been sent to test us' 
and, therefore, our faith. For example, Darwin's evolutionary theory of Man and God's 
création of M a n . 5 4 
31 wouid trust that person with anything. 
This usage indicates a récognition of gênerai virtues in a particular person. That 
trustworthiness is held in high regard signifies our esteem of those capacities (virtues) 
which can be trusted to provide a levef of certainty in a changing environment. Together 
with 6 and 11, this forms the basis of Giddens' idea of the primary functioning of modern 
trust, except that it is directed to expert Systems rather than interpersonal trust. Trust 
helps in the coordination of activities without resorting to compétition, duress or sanction 
(but may play a part in all three), and in high risk situations and complex activities it 
enables commitments to be made. 
4 We trust Caesar to lead us to victory. 
That trust as a key comportent of social capital has been rarely examined has been acknowledged in 
particular by Gambetta (1988), Dasgupta (2000) and Fine (2001). 
5 4 Little and Fearnside give this as an example of trust which is not 'rational ' (their parenthèses) because the a 
priori basis of faith is proof against disproof. 
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Trust refers to specific rather than generally recognised capacities; for example, 
leadership, toughness, courage and so on. It is a class of personal trust borne of belief. 
5 / trust you are in good health. 
The usage here is akin to the word hope. 
6 / entrust myseif to your care. 
A déclaration of trust given to the expert in récognition of his or her knowiedge or 
procédural skills. It acknowledges a gap in éducation, training or capabilities. In this 
situation, the greater the gap, the greater the trust required, since the parity of 
understanding between the layperson and expert is more likely to be remote. When trust 
is spoken in this way, it also suggests an élément of hope in that the person making the 
déclaration hopes to benefit from his or her commitment to the expert. The same can be 
said for statement 4 since we hope that Caesar 's best endeavours (excellence) will win 
the battle. 
7He's a nice enough man, but f wouldnt trust him with my money. 
Pointing to the indexical nature of trust, this indicates that that the meaning of the word 
changes with its context. In speaking about the same man, we could find ourselves 
saying that we trust him implicitly when he is talking about anything other than money. 
As soon as money is mentioned, our trust is no longer forthcoming. 
8 He seems to know what he's talking about, but I still don't quite trust him. 
This points to the feature that trust and distrust are not dichotomous. Trust, thereforejs 
scalar; that is, it has magnitude without direction. That trust has scale is signified in 
sentences such as 'I trust him completely' and Tm not sure we can altogether trust the 
figures in this report.' W e also speak of 'qualified trust' and 'unqualified trust.' 
91 have stopped trusting him because he has lied repeatediy. 
This indicates the reflexivity of trust. The magnitude of trust changes in accordance with 
our expérience of the outcomes of trust. A continuing commitment to trust is gauged 
through évidence of the actions and virtues of others. 
10 We will have to trust what he says because he is an elder. 
Like trust associated with religion, this dénotes infallibility in the object of trust and has 
its roots in tradition. 
111 don't trust Professionals. 
In contrast to the positive aspect of distance in éducation or capabilities as expressed in 
sentences 4 and 6, the negative aspect in this use of the term reveals a social and 
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ideological stance towards tradition and institutions. There is also an important Unk here 
to the concept of corporate personality. Institutions have a personality in the moral as 
well as legal sensé. They can have rights and duties, and can be reviled and trusted. 
The relationship between corporate personality and personal responsibîlity has its 
impact when we ask the professional to respond to the question why should we trust 
you or trust what you do? 
12 You will have to iake this on trust. 
Here, there is an appeal for acceptance of the knowledge and truth da ims of the 
speaker. It emphasises the link between trust and truth. 
131 trust the Boeing 747 because it has such a good safety record. 
Trust may be directed at things as well as people. In this case it acknowledges 
confidence in the reliability of performance. 
These sentences reveal the spectrum of meanings of the word trust. It has inferences of 
faith and belief, commitment to an ideological position or religion, or to knowledge 
grounded in tradition. It can also infer admiration and respect for virtues in a person or 
as an expression of confidence in a thing. In certain instances the word trust is nearer to 
the word hope. More generally, it has an association with concepts of truth and the truth-
value of statements. 
It can be used as a récognition of distance between the person making a commitment to 
trust and the person being trusted. Given the discretionary nature of trust, we can also 
say that the concept of trust is incompatible with the concept of contract: although that 
does not deny that there may be contracts which form the basis of a relationship of 
trust. 5 5 A point made by Baier (1995) is that the stability of a relationship of trust can be 
evaluated by seeing if one party is taking advantage of the other by exploiting qualities 
of the other in ways which would need to be kept hidden if the relationship is to 
continue: 
' a trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on 
qualities in the other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other 
relies on them' (Baier, 1995: p. 123). 
This brings to light the significant distinction between the normative and contractarian 
views of trust. In contracts we are given the terms and content of an exchange of 
responses and behaviours in relation to the intentions of the other. 
For example, contract conditions are not to be found in child/parent retatîonships. As time passes the 
change in the relationship is determined by moral persuasion 
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So far, then, we can identify the characteristics of the term trust as: 
• predispositional; we are disposed to degrees of trust or distrust 
• indexical; its meaning is influenced by context 
• scalar; we speak of trust in degrees between complète trust and total distrust, and 
associated with this, 
• reflexive; we guage our level of trust in accordance with our expérience of the 
outcomes of our trust 
• transférable; we can transfer our trust if we consider this appropriate. 5 6 
Having identified thèse characteristics, we can classify trust according to trust in: 
1. self: ranging from self-confidence (when it is tempered by other virtues) to arrogance 
(when it is not). 
2. the person: placed in the individual or in the individual according to his or her 
identified rôle. 
3. groups local, such as family, or institutional, such as professional group. 
4. human constructs: either material constructs such as aéroplanes, or abstract 
constructs which can be grouped into either structures of symbolic interchange, such 
as money, or Systems, such as éducation which provides a service or those which 
provide expertise. 
5. transcendentals: religion or ideology. 
6. contract performance: that is, trust in monitored performance which involves a 
necessary level of trust in both the trustée to carry out the contracted service and in 
the organisation or body to enforce the contract in case of breach. The discretionary 
component is restricted in this trust relationship and also brings into play the concept 
of primary trust (service trustée) and secondary trust (monitoring agent or System). 
This involves a tension when more trust is seen to decrease openness to challenge 
and scrutiny; in particular, when trust helps informing new relationships as a 
component of entrepreneurship and gives greater possibility of freedom from external 
régulation. 
Little and Feamsîde give an example of this in the sentence: 7 have moved my account from the Bank to 
the Crédit Union because the Bank refused to honour my chèque, even though there was money in the 
account.' 
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This classification not only gives a more diverse picture of trust but also underlines an 
ingrédient left out of the discussion of trust which is the concept of the person; a moral 
being whose identity and moral motivation may, in part, be influenced by the expérience 
of membership of a particular group. At this point we can intervene with contemporary 
virtue ethics derived from Aristotle which has sought to reinstate the person as the 
primary subject of discussion in ethics. 
Virtue ethics and moral motivation: dealing with self-interest and altruism 
Many moral philosophers make a clear séparation between the moral world and the rest 
of human life. For them, ethics begins with the question, 'what is my duty?' Aristotle, on 
the other hand, begins with a much broader question; 'what is it to lead a good life?' 
This allows him to examine those areas that we associate with the moral together with 
other éléments of human life such as friendship and intellectual commitment, and to 
consider their interrelationships and what it is to construct a good life out of ail thèse 
éléments. This richness of what morality consists makes Aristotle distinct amongst many 
other moral philosophers. For example, utilitarians use happiness and unhappiness as 
the single measure of ail moral behaviour, believing that the desirability or non-
desirability of ail moral actions could be calibrated with the same measuring 
instrument. 5 7 Aristotle not only refuses to reduce the many things of value to one single 
measure but goes further to say that it is not possible to approach a complex context 
with the same blunt measuring instrument. People coming into a complex ethical 
situation have to be alert and responsive, and be able to shape themselves to the 
particular situation. The judgement or discrimination lies in the perception of that 
situation; that is, having the ability to respond to the situation both intellectually and 
emotionally. So in Aristotle's sensé, the word 'moral' means 'practica!'; morality does not 
refer to a set of inviolable rules but to those human dispositions or virtues that make life 
liveable. The formulation of rules, then, must wait upon the development of this moral 
perception. 
For Aristotle, virtue is not a skill but an exemplary way of interacting with other people; a 
way of bringing about, through ones own intellect, émotions and actions, the aims of 
one's particular community. If we think of honesty, for example, it is not a virtue because 
it is a required skill to achieve a particular goal, but is a virtue because it represents the 
ideal of open dialogue and knowledge. Nor should virtue be considered as a solely 
/( could be thought that Aristotle is offering a type of utilitarianism since he thinks that the ultimate good in 
life is the happiness of human beings (1095a18-22). However, the focus hère is on the character of the 
virtuous person rather than the effects of the virtuous person's actions. Also, the usual translation of 
'eudaimonia' as happiness does not capture the füll meaning of the word. In its common usage the word 
happiness is understood as a mental or emotional State. 'Eudaimonia ' is something more than this. It refers to 
living well and acting well (1098b21). To say that someone is a 'eudaimon' is to make référence to how that 
someone lives and to what that someone does. Unlike happiness, 'eudamonia ' is linked to the idea of success 
and it is for this reason that Aristotle is not attempting to tell us how we are to be morally good or simply 
happy, but how to lead successfut lives. 
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moral category. We can distinguish between moral virtues such as honesty and non-
moral virtues such as a sensé of humour. 5 8 The aim is to see what part a virtue and its 
relation to other virtues plays in human life: 'the central question is not "what ought I to 
do?" but rather "what sort of person ought l to be?"' (Louden, 1997: p.205). 
Despite the criticisms which can be been made against Aristotle 5 9 , two aspects of his 
virtue ethics are appealing. Firstly, it is both a theory of morality and a theory of moral 
development. We acquire the virtues by acting virtuously and becoming virtuous is good 
for oneself and others. In this way Aristotle's argument avoids the problem associated 
with moral motivation when the individual good (self-interest) is divorced from the 
common good (altruism). Unlike Pellegrino and Carroll (2001) who question the success 
with which virtue ethics has reversed the dominance of self-interest in the professions, 
the point here is that virtue ethics removes the binary nature of the discussion regarding 
the distinction in moral motivation between Professionals and business people. 
Secondly, it provides an antidote to those ethical théories which have focused on the 
concept of duty or have assumed that peopie are governed by a universal concept of it; 
a préoccupation which has been responsible for promoting a legalistic and rule-bound 
view of morality. 
W e have duties only to the extent that we are in a position to fulfil them and the extent of 
our responsibilities is governed by what is under our control. But this leads to the 
paradox of 'moral luck' (Statman, 1993) which results from two contrary assumptions; 
the fïrst is that personal responsibility is restricted to only that which is in our control 
(what is not a matter of luck); the second is that in reality we are not in control of our 
lives since luck détermines most facets of our being and actions. 
Nevertheless, the immunity to luck has been 'hard wired' into our modem concept of 
morality, and if we are able to give up this idea then we are in a position to give up the 
idea of 'moral' as a separate category from 'non-moral.' The radical nature of virtue 
ethics is, therefore, to be found in the rejection of the term 'morality' in préférence to the 
broader term 'ethics.' 6 0 
But why should this matter to trust and social capital? 
Sometimes, however, it is not always obvious under which category a virtue fits; loyalty, for example. 
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Aristotle s ethics has been discounted by many on the grounds of its elitism. Virtue is the latent potential 
only to be found in the citizens of the polis. But citizenship is not open to women, foreigners or slaves and 
çven then 'goodness can only beinduced in a suitably réceptive character" (1179b7-29). He is also silent on 
the subject of religious belief and religious motivation, and his analytic approach makes no concession to 
human sentiment. Some may also be put offby his unyielding pursuit of success. 
6 0 But that does not mean we must reject rules, the concept of duty or the idea of absolute prohibition. 
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5 Trust and role identity 
'Capitalism is today an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which 
presents itself to him, at least as an individual, in so far as he is involved in the 
system of market relationships, to conform to capitalist rules of action' (Weber, 
1904-1905/1958: p.54). 
W e are currently living in a predominantly capitalist society. 'Capitalism appears to 
create what is perceived to be a division between economy and society, or market and 
non-market.' (Fine, 2001: p.28). Virtue ethics gives us a framework to deal with this 
perception head on in that it takes account of persons in their historical and social 
context 6 1 and need not rely on rules playing a part in moral motivation. 6 2 Moral 
motivation, therefore, is attached to the person not to the prescription of rules, a view 
which Anscombe (1981) defends by arguing that the idea of the unjust person has 
effectively disappeared and the concern for who the person is has been taken over by a 
detached consideration of what he or she may or may not do. Actions, therefore, have 
replaced persons, and behaviour has been abstracted from people in the sense that 
their role identity has been erased. 
In many conceptions of social capital this abstraction appears in the form of trust in the 
sense that its diversity of meaning is ignored and its use value is detached from the 
people who rely on it. When trust is accounted for solely as a medium that helps modern 
societies to function more efficiently, and is, therefore seen to be socially desirable, or 
perhaps as Dasgupta (2000) has it, a matter of being able to predict the behaviour of 
others when we have incomplete information, 6 3 the account is dependant on the 
commodity or use value of trust. This poses a difficulty. For example, it is 
straightforward enough to say that trust is desirable but saying so does not mean that 
when we recognise that trust is lost (since it seems to be maintained through an 
absence of contrary evidence), it can be rebuilt by managing or regulating behaviours 
which are thought to have led to its loss. Rebuilding trust may, therefore, require 
intention and disposition which is different to developing trust; possibly, an admission of 
guilt or shame extending to an apology which may also require compensation and/or 
punishment. Shame and guilt, however, are bound up with ethics not commodity. 
Maclntyre goes further to suggest that the concept of virtue is secondary to that of a role Figure who is 
always defined by a particular culture. For example, Athenian virtues in classical Greece are different to those 
of Medieval Christianity and the Enlightenment 
Nor, importantly, play a significant part in education, 
A3 
Dasgupta (2000) puts forward a number of points regarding trust. To be credible, trust requires incentives 
and the threat of punishment by an enforcing agency, for example; interaction between individual and agency 
is also required as is taking account of and estimating one another's perspectives; its value is measurable and 
deals with the expectations of other peoples actions. 
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Giddens' view of trust also faces a problem. The fact that trust may be seen to secure 
greater certainty in human activity is no guarantee of it. Trust, therefore, should not be 
confused with the absence of risk. The matter of trust still remains a matter of judgement 
which requires some element of ethical perception. In addition, trust is not always 
associated with socially desirable outcomes 6 4 and is open to abuse. So as a positive 
attribute of social functioning trust can only be associated with values that have 
boundaries and are not absolute. 
If trust is particularly important to professional roles then we need to look at the 
relationship between role identity and motivation which the concept of the person 
engages: to look at the individual in the particular role and the publicly expressed values 
of that role. 
Regarding commercial mediation, the government sees its success defined by the 
satisfaction of the parties and its own satisfaction with the impact that mediation has on 
the cost and the efficiency of the civil justice system. But satisfaction in the resolution of 
disputes is not as straightforward as arriving at an adjudication which presumes to bring 
the dispute to an end. Satisfaction extends to the parties' assessment of how their 
individual needs and interests have been met in the final outcome of the dispute. In 
effect, the parties are involved in a transformation in what they think about the outcome 
of their dispute in addition to how they will approach the next one. To that extent, the 
measure of A D R in the form of mediation is not procedural. It brings to light the 
difficulties when only settlement is used as the measure of success. Not only is pushing 
parties into settlement contrary to the principle of self-determination 6 5 but the other 
benefits associated with mediation can be pushed aside if settlement, which is clearly 
important, is pursued relentlessly. 6 6 
So, the motivation of the Government may not necessarily be congruent with the 
motivation of individual mediators to practice. Mediators' individual values and ethical 
approaches will bear upon the degree to which the 'strategy of professionalism', if any, 
is pursued. 
Such as trust found in criminal fraternities. 
6 5 Emphasis on the parlies ' rights to self-determination and informed consent lies at the heart of mediation. 
This is antithetical to the supporters of a rights based culture in a civil justice system that places emphasis on 
the use of litigation to resolve disputes. In the US, Fiss (1984) argued that every time a dispute in litigation was 
settled, it deprived the courts of giving a decision which was good for society because the law was there to be 
interpreted for the benefit of society at large. Moving the responsibility for dispute resolution from judges to 
disputants, therefore, was harmful for society because justice was eroded with every settlement. 
6 6 For example, the ethical choice between being evaluative or facultative is made on the basis of the type of 
benefit the mediation process is thought to offer. If party autonomy is identified as a benefit then the use of 
evaluative mediation is unlikely to be appropriate. 
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5 P E R S O N A L V A L U E S 
Role identity, motivation and responsibility 
So far 
Betöre setting out the approach and strategy adopted for the mediator interviews it is 
worth summarising where we have reached so far. 
W e began with a concern expressed by Morris (1997) in the U S who believed that 
professionalising médiation would unduly influence the practice of médiation through the 
promotion of North American values by a formalised élite. This extended to the 
récognition that the values of the market place are spreading globally but that the values 
of médiation do not refer solely to the market place. The question aróse as to how the 
values of individual mediators compared with the publicly expressed values of their 
professional group or organisation. In response to the attack on Professionals and 
professionalisation we suggested that in a global society trust building groups such as 
professions may be of growing significance. W e also suggested that in looking at trust 
we turn away from the opposing theoretical positions of duty and agent ethics and, 
instead, look to virtue ethics with its focus on human capacities (character). The trusted 
mediator was introduced as the organising concept of the case study. 
Chapter 2 turned to the subject of our case study and began to look at the values of 
commercial médiation in the UK expressed by government and lawyers by référence to 
an 'emerging profession.' W e also referred to C E D R ' s re-branding exercise to support 
some observations in relation to the current shape of the occupation of commercial 
médiation. 
Because professions have a significant ethical dimension Morris' suspicion of 
professionalising médiation was used as a catalyst to look at the two principal ways in 
which attempts have been made to define professions. W e underlined the view of 
Johnson (1984) who sees the application of the term 'profession' to an occupation is to 
do with a 'strategy of professionalism' which primarily strives to secure and maintain an 
exclusive relationship with the State. 
Having looked at some of the obstacles in trying to pin down any universal 
characteristics of a profession we addressed the question of whether members of a 
profession have a special ethical status. In order to do this we presented différent 
responses to the question of whether there are professional ethical roles. We identified 
these responses through three families of approaches to ethical theory; 
consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics. 
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Returning to ethical status, we took an example of one argument which tries to 
distinguish professions and businesses on the basis of their values. In this example 
Pritchard (1997) features trust as the dominant relationship between the client and the 
professional. Pritchard argues that the trust relationship is extended to one between the 
professional and the public since the professional makes a public commitment to serve 
those in need of a particular social good. This argument was contrasted with Fukuyama 
(1999) and his socio-biological view of ethical relationships which he describes through 
his particular concept of social capital. Fukuyama also features the importance of trust 
but attaches to it an emphasis that a market economy does not undermine the social 
good. 
Pritchard's and Fukuyama's approaches were used to illustrate the problems we face 
when trying to distinguish between professions and business when we rely solely on an 
antithesis between the social good and profit or altruism and self-interest. W e concluded 
with three interrelated points: 
1. in looking at the ethical dimension of modem professions it may be more engaging 
to examine how we try to reconcile professional and business rôles 
2. the rôles and responsibilities associated with personal dispositions in the context of 
business and professions could be described with more subtlety through the words 
which we understand as the virtues 
3. if trust is common to both professions and business then the meanings of trust in 
particular rôles require greater articulation. 
We began to look at the third point in the previous chapter by rejecting Fukuyama's 
notion of trust in social capital. Fukuyama speaks of humans not persons. In excluding 
the concept of the person, the components of which include identity, self and motivation, 
he describes people and trust as if they are commodities. His socio-biological outlook 
gives us no way of using the concept of social capital to gain a deeper understanding of 
modem professional work nor how social capital is put into effect in specific cultural 
settings. 
We turned to look at trust through the eyes of Giddens (1990, 1991). He argues that 
trust in the local professional in traditional society has been replaced in modem Society 
by trust in the profession as an expert System. Although Giddens, unlike Fukuyama, 
acknowledges context, we were still missing a more detailed description of the 
dimensions of trust. Utilising and expanding on the work of Little and Fearnside (2000), 
we identified the pre-dispositional, indexical, scalar, reflexive and transferable 
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characteristics of trust. We then classified trust according to trust in the self, the person, 
groups, human constructs, transcendentais and contract performance. 
Having undertaken this exercise we left the subject of trust to say why we were looking 
at the ethical status of Professionals from a virtue ethics perspective. We referred to the 
virtue ethics model derived from Aristotle which combines a theory of morality and a 
theory of moral development. 
In the Aristotelian sensé morality refers to virtues that make life worthwhile and 
désirable not to the identification and prescription of rules. This brought us back to the 
concept of the person since virtue ethics focuses on relationships with others as part of 
a person's identity and being moral as being a particular type of person; that is, the 
focus is on being rather than doing. Moreover, the appeal of the dual aspect of 
Aristotle's theory is that it bypasses the problem of moral motivation when the individual 
good (self-interest) is separated from the public or social good. In other words, virtue 
ethics defines our approach to the ethical status of Professionals since it has the merit of 
eliminating the black and white distinction between the moral motivation of Professionals 
and business people. 
Paralleling the adoption of a virtue ethics approach we acknowledged: 
• a concept of social capital which takes into account context and history and 
recognises a greater depth and subtlety to the différent types of trust 
• the concept of the person, one category under which trust can be classified. 
W e supposed that if trust is significant to professional rôles and social good is 
associated with professional motivation then it requires an examination of the 
relationship between rôle identity and motivation and how that relationship squares with 
the publicly expressed values of that rôle. 
But trust also encompasses the notion of responsibility which can be taken at two levels; 
the responsibility of the individual in practice and the responsibility of the profession to 
society. At an individual level, responsibilities give rise to more doubt as to how to 
approach a situation and how to deal with it than obligations (Whitbeck, 1992). At the 
same time even if, as individuals, we have an acute sensé of personal responsibility we 
may be out of step with understanding the wider implications of the rôle of the 
occupation or profession in society. 
A sole emphasis on codes does not do much for developing ethical perception nor 
engaging in the changing ethical situation of the occupational group. This is associated 
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with the difficulty that a client's interests and needs may be at odds with the public 
interest but a code gives no help in outlining the scope of the principle of public interest, 
and at the same time, the role of the profession is not dealt with nor the role or scope of 
the profession's code of conduct (only familiarity with the code). 
Following a professional code of conduct and focusing only on individual obligations 
without examining the limits and role of the profession is very much to blinker the 
question of professional responsibility. For example, whilst it may be that commercial 
mediators have different value emphases for mediation and different approaches to 
practice, their work is ultimately founded on the number of Settlements they can deliver. 
Three areas, therefore, are live to ethical engagement in professionalisation: 
• the application of personal values within the context of the occupation's role 
• exploring what role the occupation should take in addressing broader societal issues 
and its part in social reform 
• consideration of the professionale responsibilities beyond those of adhering to a 
professional code. 
We now reach the point where we have to describe our approach to value research in 
light of the conceptuatisation of values adopted by this research project. 
Approach to value research and associated problems 
According to Johnson (1999) ethics in the professions appears to be based on an 
assumption of a person being a rigid seif with two competing elements comprising self-
interest and a 'higher' moral seif. However characterising ethical thinking in this way 
does not seem to ring true. We do not reason syllogistically when it comes to ethics. In 
practice, in other words, we do not say this Situation is a case where a particular 
principle applies and, therefore, I must act in this particular way. 
Johnson, basing his argument on research from the fields of linguistics and cognitive 
psychology, says that many ethical concepts are not universal but prototype concepts 
which are deep in our experience. Values, therefore, are part and parcel of our 
personality. A simple model (Fig.3) appears to lie at the heart of approaches to value 
research. 
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Fig 8. Value research: core model 
The model is based on two assumptions; firstly, that a person's behaviour is based on 
behavioural intentions which, in turn, are moulded by values; secondly, that a person's 
values are influenced by their social environment and their social status. These 
assumptions resuit in two pathways for the links between three levels of analysis: 
moving from macro-level circumstances and context to a person's value orientations to 
a person's intentions to a persons behaviour. The model also indicates that social 
position is linked directly to values. (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). 
In Chapter 1 of this paper we referred to întentional understanding which aims to explain 
appearances through concepts by which we expérience and give meaning to our 
interactions with others. It involves identifying descriptions of conceptualisations of the 
world which we construct out of subjective expérience. Value is one such 
conceptualisation. 
Given its subjective nature it is not surprising that the term 'value' has différent 
meanings. The sociological concept of the term embraces norms, manners and 
idéologies. Additionally, désire, reason and necessity appear as the foundation of values 
in philosophy and psychology. As such, there seems to be no common understanding of 
value across the disciplines nor do specific disciplines achieve any consensus on the 
use of the term. 
A value(s) can be seen as; 
« a standard 
• a standard by which we judge what is important 
something regarded to have worth 
something we aim for 
a principle by which we act 
• beliefs in action 
• qualities to which we conform 
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personal virtues. 6 7 
The difficulty extends to value descriptors too. One person's interpretation of 'integrity', 
for example, may be different to another's. It could be argued that it may be easier for 
people to make explicit their values if they are asked 'what do you value' rather than 
'what are values.' 6 8 But this approach presents a problem for the researcher in that it 
gives little basis for an analytic strategy. We need to specify a conceptualisation of 
values without having to ask people what values are. 
Following Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) 6 9 we use three characteristics to formulate 
the conceptual boundaries of the term 'values.' 
1 values engage moral discourse which means we need to look at the sort of moral 
discourse which would indicate the social dimension of values. As moral concepts, 
values cannot be detached from all those situations and events which make up our 
everyday lives and everyday environments. Values are part of the way we think, make 
judgements and behave. What this means is that values cannot be researched on their 
own. Because everyday life involves participation in different groups and activities 
people find themselves having to reconcile with family, professional, business and other 
values; these can be broadly categorised as private or public, individual or group values. 
Because people occupy different social environments values must be examined in their 
social context. And different contexts infer different values. 
2 values present themselves as conceptions of the desirable. 7 0 A desire is a wish or 
want; an expression of need. When we say something is desirable, however, we engage 
Until the late nineteenth century the term 'value' was used only as a singular noun to mean to hold in high 
regard or worth. Nietzsche introduced its plural form as personal virtues in his attack on Christianity and 
Judaism which he condemned as dogmatic and oppressive. He argued that each person should be able to 
choose his or her own personal virtues (or values as we now refer to them). 
6B 
Since interviewees can give answers grounded in their own experience and beliefs. 
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Van Deth's and Scarbrough's research examined the influence of values and changing values on beliefs in 
Western European governments. Their approach to identifying values is to treat them as orientations which 
give a framework to an individual's attitudes and behaviour. Given that values are not open to direct 
observation, values assume the status of a dispositional concept. This means that the presence of values and 
their influence can be shown by looking at the realisation of values in defined contexts. This applies to value 
orientations where it is possible to describe a social context. If values are hidden behind attitudes then finding 
a pattern among a number of different attitudes points to some non-observable phenomenon at work. Our 
research, however, does not extend to taking values as components in a pattern of behaviour nor is it a values 
clarification exercise that aims to establish a list of common values amongst mediators. 
7 0 Van Deth and Scarbrough refer to McLaughin (1965) who identifies three common characteristics of values: 
they cannot be observed; they are not to be found independent of biological organisms or social environments; 
and they have cognitive, affective and connotive aspects.McLaughlin believes that all descriptions of the value 
concept which are not qualified by these three characteristics are either arbitrary or are dependent upon the 
underlying theoretical context of the particular research project. He maintains that three specific questions 
need to be confronted: firstly, whether values refer to desire or desirability; secondly, whether values have a 
rank order in a personality system; and thirdly, whether values are determinants of behaviour. In the context of 
their own research, Van Deth and Scarbrough discard the second and third questions. These, they think, must 
present themselves for empirical testing rather than an a priori response since it would be difficult to arrive at 
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wi(h moral considérations in which 'wanf changes to ought' (Van Deth and Scarbrough. 
1995: p.26). Values, therefore, tend towards prescriptive rather than descriptive 
Statements. 
3 values cannot be observed directly but there seems to be a gênerai consensus that 
values play a significant part in action; that is values are 'desirabilities in matters of 
action' (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995: p.30). They are the measure of the ethical 
dimension of actions which, for the purposes of our research, include making 
judgements and reaching décisions in how we choose to be. But whiist values are 
associated with questions of action, they are not in themselves prescriptive. For 
example, justice may be considered a value but that does not give us any due as to 
what actions we need to take to arrive at justice. 
Analytic strate g y and interview framework 
One of the central tenets of the practice of médiation is the concept of neutrality. The 
term 'neutral' is often used to describe the mediator as an impartial practitioner. Clearly 
no mediator can be strictly neutral in the sensé that he or she can discard ail his or her 
values, attitudes and beliefs (Brown and Marriott, 1999). This applies not only to when a 
mediator is mediating but also to how the mediator locates and establishes himself or 
herself as a professional person. The concept of neutrality is useful in that it helps us to 
remember that in its broad usage 'neutral' does not cover the mediator's undeclared 
values. It also serves to remind us of the peculiarity of the mediator's work environment 
in which the client always consists of more than one party. In any event, ignoring the 
concept does not assist the practitioner in developing his or her own ethical awareness. 
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Values are essentially subjective, developing as a resuit of an individual's expérience 
and social context. Whiist we can reflect on values, it is more difficult to reflect on what 
lies behînd their formation. A question arises, therefore, in connection with the capacity 
of commercial mediators to reflect on the value components of (1) their social rôle and 
commercial médiation generally and (2) their practice as individual mediators. Our 
research is restricted to exploring (1) in relation to the 'strategy of professional ism. ' 7 2 
Whiist the Government is showing support for médiation and ADR, do we assume that 
the increasing practice of médiation constitutes the émergence of an institutionalised 
answers to empirical questions about values when values are abstract phnciples. So they focus on the 
question of whether values are desires or desirabilities. 
7 1 Brown and Marriott (1999) bighlight three general areas of ethicat awareness for mediators. They referto 
mediators' attitude to conflict, their capacity to deal with emotional parties in relation to a notional rational-
emotional spectrum and the awareness of their own individual values and beliefs. 
7 2 Ethical issues related, for exampie, to dealing with conflicts ofinterest, preserving impartiality. maintaining 
confidentiality in mediation etc are noi encompassed by this msearch projeci. 
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profession or that the conditions of trust are based on professional legitimacy? Many of 
those who call themselves mediators may well want to pursue a 'strategy of 
professionalism' but this may be a professionalism increasingly borne of client control 
and market demand. 7 3 
W e want to explore how commercial mediators articulate their own values in terms of 
the rôle of the mediator with which they identify and to what extent they see themselves 
as participants in the emerging profession. This has two components; (1) mediators' 
perceptions of their own rôle, motivation to practice and sensé of responsibility in the 
emerging profession and (2) how they look at their professional environment. This 
involves separating analytically the mediator's self-image as a professional from any 
da ims to emerging profession. The objects of analysis are not values but individuals 
who expérience membership of a particular group; in this case, they are pioneers and 
influential practitioners in the commercial médiation community. 
Our framework for interviews is, therefore, composed of two sets of questions derived 
from the two principal research questions: 
(1) Do mediators privately accept the values of médiation expressed publicly by 
Government? 
(2) Can the social rôle of mediator be seen as a sociological category (if it is not 
then we are talking about the adoption of a particular practice by an existing 
profession or group of professions rather than the émergence of an exclusive 
profession). 
The first research question is addressed in interviews by prompting with the questions: 
• What are the quality goals of médiation? 
These as Morris (1997) points out may be any one or a combination of party autonomy 
and self-determination, party satisfaction, community soiidarity, social justice, social 
order, personal, group or societal transformation, cost/efficiency, seulement rates and 
any others identified by respondents. Our analysis will need to distinguish between five 
types of value claim: 
• Instrumental (x is good for y) 
• Intrinsic (x is good) 
The possibîlity of variance in trust rai'ses questions regarding both the professionalisation of commercial 
médiation and whether a value model is enough to deschbe it. 
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• Comparative (x is better than y) 
• Décision orientée! {x is right) 
• Idealised (x is good as it can be) 
• How do you measure success in médiation? 
The second research question is addressed in interviews by prompting with the 
questions: 
• Do you see médiation associated with the practice of law or the practice of dispute 
resolution? 
• What must mediators know to practise? 
• What do you see as the drivers for the régulation of commercial médiation? 
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6 VIRTUOUS MEDIATORS 
Changing context 
Despite the fact that the use of médiation is increasing, Genn (2002) reports that 
commercial practice lawyers are still hésitant to use médiation despite évidence of 
positive expérience. Clients using médiation who signal the highest levels of satisfaction 
with médiation cite mediators with excellent skills and familiarity with the subject area of 
the dispute. Also, whilst médiation may save the potential cost of progressing a case to 
trial through earlier seulement, those cases which do not settle through médiation 
increase the parties' costs. One view suggests that a party who thinks it has a genuinely 
strong case is unlikely to mediale. Another view is that if there is a strong commitment to 
settle the case through médiation then solicitors should be capable of arriving at a 
settlement. W e have also seen the landmark case of Dunnett v Railtrack in which the 
défendant (Railtrack) winning its case on appeal, was declined an order to costs for 
having turned down a recommendation by the court to consider médiation. Now, if a 
party flatly refuses médiation, even if it believes it has a water-tight case, then it will be 
penalised in costs. However, this stick which the judges are beginning to wield may 
bring potential challenges for both the government and mediators. The use of médiation 
is likely to increase but with the accompanying risk that unless the parties can see the 
benefits of using médiation rather than responding to the potential danger of cost 
sanctions, a disaffected party may enter the médiation process with no genuine intention 
to settle with the result that litigation is prolonged. For those mediators who see 
settlement as the purpose of médiation this may pose an ethical problem in that they 
may see the parties as abusing the process. For those mediators who do not attach 
settlement as the priority this will be less of a concern. 
Set in this changing context, how commercial mediators understand their role is of 
increasing significance. How they perceive their roles not only gives a starting point for 
developing their ethical perception but will also begin to structure questions related to 
the identification of types of médiation interventions to which the mediator is ethically 
allied. 
Interview summary 
Eight leading commercial mediators (identified M1 to M8), who are or have been closely 
associated with C E D R , participated in semi-structured interviews. Amongst them two 
were women and three were non-lawyer mediators. Apart from prompt questions, no 
attempt was made to establish a uniformity of questions or content in the interviews. By 
sending papers to them beforehand, as described in Chapter 1, interviewées were 
encouraged to elaborate on those points they feit relevant and follow their own line of 
thought and offer comments. 
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Key Statements, transcribed from the tape recordings, were broadly categorised by 
responses in connection with and discussion on the prompt questions identified in the 
previous chapter. 
The two primary research questions (1, do mediators privately accept the values of 
médiation expressed by government? and 2, can the social role of mediator be seen as 
a modern socioiogical category?) were addressed by relating the catégories to the types 
of value daim and value associations made in connection with mediators' own 
perspectives on médiation, their professional identity and sense of responsibility. The 
purpose of the interviews, therefore, was not to identify common values but to set out 
mediators' value descriptions and to see how far these were congruent with the values 
expressed by government and how they located themselves ethically regarding their 
role and professionalisation. 
Three value Claims and three countervailing concepts of settlement, 
transformation and power 
In their interviews mediators' responses were expressed through three value Claims with 
différent emphases (underlined in the text). Lawyer mediators in the group tended to 
contrast médiation with litigation practice whereas non-lawyer mediators described a 
similarity in their approach to negotiation and working relationships. For lawyers, 
médiation was generally seen as an antidote to the negative aspects of the litigation 
process although this did not imply that médiation was an alternative or replacement for 
litigation. 
7 saw litigation as taking people away from the truth...also a horribly inefficient 
process...game-playing andposturing...there wasn't even aïways a good clean 
knockout so you could say right i've won...often ended up in a muddy 
compromise. Mediation seemed like a much more efficient process by creating 
a ciimate of trust and focus...to get right to the heart ofthings and that people 
would behave from their better selves rather than their worse selves so there's a 
developmentat aspect, quite a moral approach to it to do with human potential, 
learning and growing, learning from things that go wrong rather than being self-
righteous and positional and blaming which is what I see the litigation process 
encourages.' (MO') 
'It seemed to me that litigation was quite wasteful of peopfes resources, 
énergies, émotions...if people could negotiate, as some could, through their 
lawyers or barristers that was the ideal way of sorting things out...but the either 
or of if you can 't settle this then you go to litigation and spend masses of money 
and building up a case against the other person seemed to be a bit of a 
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nonsense...don't gei me wrong l'm very pro litigation, every society needs a 
litigation System because that's part of a democracy and l'm also a believer in 
the "shadow of the law" principle I don't believe people would médiate 
successfully if they didn't have the courts...not a matter of human nature that 
everyone wants to settle ifonly they had an opportunity. ' (M1 ) 
7 think we are here to mitigate wasteful pre-occupation and unnecessary pain 
which I see as the by-products of conflict. When ! corne to a médiation what I 
normaliy see is people who have spent quite some years having their dispute 
run for them by Professionals who will say they are doing a splendid Job, with 
their clients interests at heart but who in truth are making sure they're getting 
paid properly for doing so. ' (M6) 
the pervading motivation is that it [médiation] gets out of the field in which 
one set of people tell another set of people what to do. l'm profoundly against 
that' (M4) 
For non-lawyers, médiation tended to formalise the positive aspects of their approach to 
relationships or negotiation in their own fields of practice: 
7 had no conscious sort of tenet of good relations mean good business and it 
was then unconscious thinking that informed a lot ofthe work I did because one 
ofthe reasons I was used...was when problems occurred we built up a level of 
trust which meant that people were prepared to work co-operatively to résolve 
the problems as opposed to becoming defensive and fighting their corner...that 
was something I hadn't been conscious about until I got into médiation and 
realised that what I had been doing was something that is very close to what we 
do as mediators. ' (M5) 
'The method of helping them to negotiate is very similar to that of médiation, 
except I wasn't neutral. I was representing individual interests... the 
methodoiogy, being aware of the interests of both parties and making sure 
things could work post acquisition, kind of led me into médiation. It seemed to 
be natural that you didn't just win for your dient at all costs because what did 
you do the next day afteryou've won?...Life begins when you sign the contract, 
it doesn't end, it's when you Start...it seemed to make sensé to look 
forward...the contract is something you worked from not worked to...and 
médiation then became of inierest but as a mediator I had to learn to be 
neutral.'[U2) 
14 
However, this simple lawyer/non-lawyer distinction did not delineate the range of views 
in relation to what mediators privately saw as the moral imperative of commercial 
médiation. In other words, what mediators saw as the purpose of médiation and the type 
of value claim associated with it was not defined by whether they were lawyers or non-
lawyers. Their value daims also determined the extent to which they wished to locate 
médiation outside the practice of law. But the type of value claim did not necessarily 
reflect the mediator's own measurement of success in médiations. 
Intrinsic value daims (médiation is good) 
Emphasis on greater Potential for fairness of outcome (social equitv) 
7 don 't think it's about social order or justice at all.. .this is a way of getting cases 
out of the courts not a way of reducing the number of cases or number of 
disputes...it's a way of dealing with them quickly and cheaply...it doesn't give 
greater access to justice. If everybody has the right to court then that's not 
improved by offering médiation, it's just a choice of a method of resolving it 
which is potentially more efficient and less painful than going through court...the 
thing that I learnt quite late on, I guess, in life, is that peopie see the same 
events and read the same facts through différent eyes and that means that any 
adjudicational solution is fiawed because things are not black or white, right or 
wrong, it's just varying degrees...to me that's one of the best things that 
médiation can offer is for that to be taken into account and to inform the 
eventual settlement. I think, actualiy, that is greater access to justice, upon 
reflection. Ifyou can measure justice in fairness of outcome.. .1 think there is the 
opportunity of a fairer and therefore more just outcome in médiation. ' (M5) 
This was also set in the context of dominant market forces: 
7 think there is a recognising of the motivation of the eighties and nineties for 
success being measured by wealth and power and so on...is quite a hollow 
message... peopie have gone through it, even those who have achieved it see 
that there's something lacking.. .most human beings want to relate to other 
human beings...and there's no doubt that médiation is a human process, its 
making peopie communicate and one of the by-products is that peopie do often 
leave [médiation] feeling that they have learnt something that is more than 
dispute resolution. ' (M5) 
7 wouldn't want to identify it with the practice of law ...because the practice of 
law is too closely identified with adversarial processes and of course now l'm 
saying law means litigation which is just one part of it... I don't know what 
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category to put it [médiation] into...fundamentafiy \ think we're just givingpeople 
a shot at breaking out of the circle that's created by the litigation process...at 
base you're talking about creating an opportunity ...a mediator is not a 
relationship manager...we're breaking out of a System that's been created over 
générations that is unfair...but there are disputes which need an adjudicated 
décision.. .the mediator is primariiy building a relationship of trust with the 
parties. There 's nothing legal about that at all. ' (M5) 
"enlarging the pie" and having "win-win" situations is a great theory and 
motivation but rarely happens in practice.. .it's usualiy much more "pain-pain" 
and to a certain extent I use that in médiations because shared pain is as much 
a reason for seulement as anything eise. I don't know ifthey feel empowered or 
not...rock-bottom, my objective is to help them résolve a dispute and not go to 
court...I think a lot of people just want to have a face-saving opportunity to 
knock this on the head without appearing to give in to the other side...just get rid 
of it...the more médiations I do... this [face-saving] is quite a significant reason 
for them agreeing to médiation.' (M5) 
In relation to this mediator's own measurement of success: 
7'd like to say it's because I give them the best opportunity for them to résolve 
their dispute.. .it's they who say yes to seulement or not. I give them the best 
shot at doing a deal but in my heart I still measure success as seulement...Even 
if l've given them the best chance I could to settle but if they didn't settle I still 
feel as if l've failed. It's probably one ofthe biggest motivations for the follow-up 
afterwards of the phone calls. ' (M5) 
Instrumental value claims (médiation is good for society) 
Emphasis on relationship and responsibilitv 
7 think it's more about personal development in some way.it libérâtes people 
from getting mired down in some sort of negative process.. .it's like the 
microcosm and the macrocosm, how people behave in their day to day 
relationships...some dispute over a contract is also mirrored in the larger arena 
in terms of wortd relationships and world events...if people can work out their 
banal différences in a beUer way at that level, then that helps society as a 
whole... that somehow changes the energy.. there's more positive energy and 
less negative energy around how people behave when there's a conflict 
...socialjustice to me implies an ideoiogicalleft wing hght wing analysis...! know 
some people say that in social justice terms there are problems with médiation. ' 
(M3) 
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7 see ä as the practice of dispute résolution.. .because it's bigger than 
law...there's overlap between the two...but äs much bigger than law and ifyou 
take médiation as a whoie, not just commercial médiation, that happens in many 
ftelds, some which have very little contact with law like community médiation or 
environmental.. .it's a very big field in its own right...the dispute resolution field 
draws on many disciplines...psychology, negotiation theory, politics and 
sociology, international relations...loads of disciplines...it just happens to be 
that commercial médiation tends to be played out in an arena that's about the 
law but there's no reason why that has to be...even dispute resolution is too 
narrow...it's about relationship, it's about managing différence at its 
broadest...What I would like to see is the médiation intervention being made 
much earlier in the business context.. .the more we can educate the business 
clients in seeking assistance with the intervention of someone who is skilled in 
this discipline earlier...a person who just manages the relationship,' (M3) 
For this mediator, personal success was described in terms of contributing to a social 
transformation that went beyond seulement of the dispute: 
'...to see a transformation from the beginning ofthe day where people have not 
been able to talk to each other ...feeling they have to speak through their 
lawyers to some exchange where they can deal again...to me there's a 
satisfaction in seeing that shift...and most of the litigation process obscures 
that...it's something about people's authentic direct expérience...they're moved 
from a rights position to taking responsibility for their own personal 
expérience...a sensé of closure...that people can put things behind them ...a 
sensé of having learnt something from the process.. .and at a basic level that 
they have been able to reach a seulement...It would be silly to say that it's not a 
factor, it clearly is...just that on äs own it's a crude measure...the other things 
l've mentioned in the grand scheme of things, are more important than 
seulement or not...in terms of my sensé of médiation as a iarger social 
movement, phenomenon.. .and a paradigm shift in the way people relate to 
each other...then there's a danger [if seulement is the primary focus] or" 
mediators becoming too directive. ' (M3) 
Again success was measured at micro and macro levels: 
' / think there are two ways I can look at that. One is on an individual case basis 
where I think, for me, if I see as outcomes for the parties that they have had 
satisfaction on the three levels of process, outcome, and emotion and are able 
to move on then that has been successful. I think there are other ways in which 
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it can be successful too but l think those are three major fronts on which I would 
look to a médiation to be aiming for. On the bigger front.. .it dawned on me that 
what we were doing was actually turning around the legal system.. .and in terms 
of how I see that now I see that as being a move to enable people in ail walks of 
Hfe over any kind of difficulty they have, whether it's High Court stuff or whether 
it's just an interpersonal one, of being able to tap into something which will 
provide them with the potential for those three areas. ' (M8) 
Emphasis on social order (not social transformation) 
7 think it's good and I think it's maintaining social order... ail ofitis designed to 
reduce the tension and destructive power of conflict and this is done by 
médiation, however they actually label it, but it is a médiation process. ' (M2) 
'Practice of médiation to me is to deal with dispute resolution. However, it 
cornes to us via lawyers who are practising it as part of their litigation armour 
and it cornes with ail the caveats and the restrictions because the lawyers have 
invested an awful lot in putting their files together. Their clients have paid for it -
they don t want to appear that they've wasted a lot of their time for which they've 
billed the client...and so I think we are stuck with starting from the position of 
this is litigation therefore it follows legal principle and what I think we do as 
mediators we move to creating the environment where parties are capable of 
resolving their dispute but we have to transform it from one to the other, a 
différent transformation. We're transforming it from a litigation approach to a-
dispute resolution approach...Incidentally, one ofthe things that always amazes 
me is that lawyers seil time [in litigation] and clients are buying results. The two 
just don't seem to fit together very well...I certainiy don't regard médiation as the 
practice of law...! simply was reflecting on the basis that lawyers think that it 
might be an extension of law...The reason why people might have corne to 
médiation means that they are prepared to look at some resolution outside the 
Statute, the actual précèdent of what's in the rufe books...because their case 
doesn't fit square with that...if it's a matter which has to be settied by rules then 
it cornes to a judge, it doesn't corne to me because the lawyers are the 
gatekeepers.. .To me what we médiate is not part ofthe legal System.' <M2) 
However, this mediator was able to detach himself more readily from the idea of 
success being measured by seulement because of a différent perception of his rôle 
which is to: 
78 
'...act as a catalyst beiween the two parties to heip them résolve that particufar 
issue...to create the space where they can résolve if they wish to ...they dont 
have to résolve...! will create the space and the opportunity where you can have 
a dialogue...If as a resuit you can achieve some form of seulement that's great 
and if you dont that's fine. While it is nice when peopie are able to achieve 
seulement, that's not my objective as mediator.. .l'm there to create the space 
and the environment where you can work to try and résolve whatever it is you 
want to try to résolve. ' <M2) 
So is the mediator someone whose rôle is to transfer information in a negottation where 
parties wish to secure their best interests; a mediator who recognises that the System 
may be engineered and that his or her intervention would be fatal to the process? Or, is 
the mediator someone whose rôle is to help the parties assess their settlement options 
and to peel away obstacles ta settlement negotiations? 
'My own sensé of what I do as a mediator is not transformative.. .1 dont feel I 
need to transform the behaviour of the parties in that dispute.. .l'm not there as a 
conciliator and I see transformative médiation as part conciliation, only part...lt's 
very différent to the catalytic action that happens when two peopie get together 
with the aid of a compétent mediator.. .they may go off to do other deals or they 
may not...to me that's something they will do but that's not the purpose of why 
l'm there. ' (M2) 
This mediator's orientation was underscored by an observation on the spread of the 
market economy and its affects: 
'l'm afraid the introduction of the global economy and globalisation encourages 
more of win as much as you can and not share with others and if as a resuit, of 
every ten cases they [managers] lose six, they only count the four and ignore 
the six...they have to make their réputations on the four. ' (M 2) 
Comparative value daims (médiation is better than litigation) 
Emphasis on lower cost and greater access to justice 
'The primary purpose of médiation is to keep disputes out of the court...cost 
stands preUy high up in the hierarchy because when I say keep them out of the 
courts there are two aspects...one is having absolutely no control, and t say as 
a practising lawyer, no ability io predict the outcome. I refuse to say thèse days 
what the outcome is going to be because l've given up. Secondly, undoubtedly, 
it's a question of cost because if you go to trial, inevitably, it means a huge 
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cost...your own cosí, business time costs, management costs and emotional 
cost.' (M7) 
Also mediation as a reaction to the uncertainty of litigation: 
7 think ciients nave always wanted more certainty, well, always wanted a 
measure of certainty and when they ask me for certainty I tell them I can't be 
certain. That's why I teil them they ought to be mediating,..i don't think the 
courts have heiped matters much because they've made the Ufe of a lawyer a 
lot more diffícuit because they tend to jump around a lot and change their 
minds...ciients probably ask for certainty a lot more because they're very much 
more sensitive to the vaiue of money and the way they're spending their 
money.' (M7) 
7 certainty see mediation as a very useful tool in my practice as a Iñigator. 
That's the fundamental advantage to mediation as far as t'm concemed. In other 
words, it's something Wat I can use when i'm acting for ciients to resolve their 
disputes. In the wider context virtually all the reasons for the advantages of 
mediation within my professional practice have paraliel advantages in the wider 
context be it the israeli-Arab context or be it a neighbourhood dispute...! see it 
as the practice of dispute resolution, undoubtedly. It's not reaily necessarily the 
practice of law and, indeed, most mediators in the end don't revolve around 
discussing the legai position.. .they do at the beginning or, indeed, looking at the 
various documents. As a mediator-lawyer or lawyer-mediator you will take a 
view, inevitably, as to the strengths and weaknesses ofeach particular case but 
one of the diffículties I find in mediation is it's sometimes a fairiy uphill battle to 
challenge the lawyers on their particular points...! think some ofthe times one of 
the diffículties is getting them [lawyers] off their particular hobby-horse without 
embarrassing them...one of the challenges that face lawyers who particípate in 
mediations is to forget or to appreciate that a mediation is not a rehearsal of the 
trial.' (M7) 
7 measure success in my own mediations when the case setties or if the case 
settles.. .Now a purist may say, well, it may have been successful if it's 
managed to narrow the issues, it's got the parties talking ...that may be so, but if 
I'm actually asking myself.. .success in a mediation is settlement... My main aim 
is to keep the thing out ofcourt or arbitration. I'm afraid I strongly feel that court 
or arbitration is a failure unless there are very, very special circumstances.' (M7) 
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But another mediator responding to where cost and efficiency stood in the hierarchy of 
the government's goals said that these were: 
'...pretty low down. I think some of the important things for government are, 
sadly, about things like votes, image...and it's the antithesis, in a way, of 
mediation because for me mediation is a process where the person who is in 
charge, in a way you could describe a mediator as that, is actuaiíy the ieast 
important person there...and in government that's not the case...There's afso 
an issue about cost where if the up front costs of putting conflict prevention 
management and resoiution processes in place is identified, its oñen not 
justifiable prior to those disputes [emerging] ...to invest that money into a more 
peaceful Mure down the Une, it's difficult to justify its cost effectiveness.. .it's 
not, i think in the government's minds, a positive first thought. It's not the thing 
that leaps into mind like Kellogs and breakfast.' (M8) 
Emphasis on self-determination and autonomv 
'One of the principie goals of mediation is to get away from a system in which 
one set of people tell another set of people what to do...1 think litigation and a 
legal system perpetúate that...fundamentally, for me, H ought to restore to 
people an abiíity to make their own chotee about their own destiny but to make 
that choice with information.. .with someone there to try and check that they are 
looking realisticatly at all the options available to them and the consequences of 
the choices they might take. That, for me, is the number one príority. Number 
two, perhaps surprisingly, is the abiiity to resolve conflict otherwise than through 
a process of violence in which I would include litigation. Violence in this sense 
for me is a power struggle...and if people resolve their confíiets merely as the 
result of exercising power...then I see that as a dismal failure of human 
relations, whether it takes place on a world stage or on a court stage.. .so I think 
the quality goal should be to free us from that...to me it is to do with having 
respect for people.' (M4) 
The mediator's reference to power relations is restricted to the parties but a mediator's 
claim to neutrality can itself be used to exert pressure on the parties. The mediator has 
a great dea! of power in the sense of receiving sensittve or confidential information in 
prívate meetings and acting as the gatekeeper regarding the conveyance of that 
information and other messages. 
As to success in mediation? Again, mediation was seen as beneficial for society but 
tempered by the idea of settlement: 
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' / don t think there 's any one single mark.. .for one îhing if i see someone who is 
in a position of greater power declining to use it and getting to a solution by 
différent means then, I think, that is a huge success for the médiation and 
almost for the worid.. finding a way of resolving it [conflict] without a fight is a 
success for médiation...! suppose if you're in business as a professional 
mediator.. .you have to say success is partly composed of the number of cases 
you have which settle. You have to face commercial life. People are unlikely to 
choose you, however good your motives are, if most of your cases end up in 
non-settlement.. .the difficulty then for the mediator is the degree to which he 
might prostitute his principies in order to get a resuit. ' (M4) 
The mediator later added: 
'If I were to be asked the question what do you think people ought to expect of 
you as a mediator then...l dont think people looking for a mediator in a 
commercial dispute would pick the things l've picked. I think they wouid have a 
différent set of values from the mediator. ' (M4) 
Emphasis on fairness of process 
...the process of médiation is very important...médiation must be and be 
perceived as being équitable, effective. A process which gives people a 
genuine hearing.. .that they feel understood, they corne out of ä feeling they've 
been heard... AU disputes involve emotion, some more than others...! believe 
people in médiation have an opportunity to be heard and express their 
émotions...The sensitivity to people being heard and understood is an incredibly 
important part ofthe médiation process ...Outcome is important but the process 
of being heard and acknowledged is too. Not head-banging. ' (M1 ) 
The last comment points to risk that the more cases judges push towards médiation, the 
more litigation lawyers may be inclined to opt for those who call themselves mediators 
and who see nothing wrong with 'head-banging' in the belief that the parties are there to 
arrive at a seulement, corne what may, on the day. 
7 know there is a school of thought that says médiation is empowering and I 
have a difficulty with that... I think it may be, it may not be. Empowerment may 
be a by-product of médiation but it is not the aspiration. Indeed if we as 
mediators start making it as the basis of our work we are actually behaving 
improperly. I would go as far as saying that. People dont corne to be 
empowered, to be transformed, they corne because they have a dispute which 
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is going to court next Thursday, and what they've asked for in the contract we've 
offered them is to heip them settle that dispute. Settfement, yes, but to reach 
that goal in a reasonabiy sensitive way..,when people come to mediation they 
have a dispute they want to have resolved...peopie don't come to commerciai 
mediation because they want their inner conflicts resofved and they didn't want 
to come in because they want to be transformed or they want society to be 
transformed.. .My personal starting point is they've come, and the contract and 
the deal is, in order to get a result.. .Settlement would be my first proposition.' 
(M1) 
Professional identity and interpersonal trust: personaltty versus professional 
stereotype 
For one mediator the instrumental value Claim made for mediation was a chalienge to 
reconcile with the picture of a particular mediator type: 
7 think one issue for me is to what extent I go public on the types of views l've 
expressed to you about mediation being a morally good thing and good for 
society...which is what motivates me...and the sort of image of a mediator 
which I feel perhaps is more marketable of the robust, ex-City lawyer, high 
settlement rates, gets results, bangs heads together, nothing namby-
pamby...and how I present myselfin those stereotypes.' (M3) 
This turned on a comparison with lawyer behaviours and a personal attempt to lesson 
the gap between professional and personal roles: 
'There was a very definite rate and behaviour that was different to who I was in 
the rest of my life and there was a tension between the two that became 
intolerable and that's partly why I had to leave [litigation] ...to me being a 
professional as a litigator meant I didn't disclose my own moral position on 
behaviours that the dient was doing...the only time I could chalienge what they 
were doing morally or ethically was when it was in conflict with solicitor 
ethics.. .which is a very low stung safety net...it gives a lot of scope for bad 
behaviour without actuaily being unethical.. .there were also values and 
behaviours about competitiveness, game-playing...out-manoeuvring people...It 
[mediation] has brought me closer to my non-professional self...l still make a 
distinction between the two...and there's this whole question about impartiality, 
neutrality.. .one of the developmental things for me is how I can disclose more of 
myself in a non-judgemental way...[neutrality] I hate the word. I think it's really 
unhelpful.. .non-partisan is much better.' (M3) 
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There were similar views regarding one's personality as an instrument of médiation: 
7 don't feel I take something off when I ieave home and corne to work and 
equally, vice versa...! find ! get resentful when other people put me in...a rôle 
that is not me...and I think I am myseif when i médiate. I certainiy présent 
myselfsimpiy as myseif. f don't feel the need to act as anything l'm not. ' (M8) 
7 am increasingly integrating my personal and professional life...when I was 
younger the professional rôle seemed terribty important, now I find myseif very 
uncomfortable if I have to put on a mediator persona. ! actually can't do it. I can't 
even put on a lawyer persona... But even before I was a mediator I was 
increasingly practising in a person relevant way... My way of mediating very 
much involves me... I can't puff up, they won't corne to me if they don't like my 
style...I can be tough in a médiation but I believe it's not from a posture but it 
cornes from something I can be comfortable with all the time. ' (M1 ) 
However, style equated with personality poses problems. As the same mediator said, 
'there is a sting in the tail.' The market is demanding a particuiar persona; a commodity. 
This came across in mediators' reactions to whether they were happy with their 
descriptions in Chambers Guide to the Legal Profession 2001-2002 which for the first 
time included non-lawyers under its A D R practitioner section. 
Vf sounds fine as a start but sounds like a safe pair of hands but not very 
exciting...! perhaps don't mind it that it doesn't give a flavour of the sorts of 
things we've talked about.'(M3) 
'It's not my description, it's others that describe it...[x] is not a word I would 
use...! think it is a reasonable thumbnail...It hasn't brought me a vast volume of 
work but that's a différent issue. I think there's an issue that commercial people 
want somebody to help them résolve their dispute...they're going to bring their 
clients so l think they are more likely to select people who they perceive as 
being abte to eut through and deal with the commercial issues within an initial 
time frame. if a profile is put before them [clients] with somebody who they 
perceive as having an ability to communicate and understand with them they're 
more likely to corne to médiation.. .not just because the CPR rules require them 
to be mere.'(M2) 
'My immédiate reaction was great.. .one of thèse litigators is going to read this 
and think about me and probabiy say they don 't want x to médiate, they want 
84 
someone who's tough and can control and aii that sort ofthing. I dont know if 
that's had any effect on people choosing me. ' (M5) 
'It's a fairly non-committat description... to be described as [x] doesn't reaiiy tell 
you much about his skills as a mediator...it doesn't do me any harm...l don't 
think it does me much good. ' (M7) 
Although it sticks in my gullet to admit it, I dare say that what Chambers said in 
2001 about me isn't far from the truth...lf I were to write my epitaph as a 
mediator those are not necessariiy the words I would want at the top of my 
list...l'm happy that they're there though. ' (M6) 
Those mediators that referred directly to interpersonal trust, described it either as a 
function of the attribute of genuineness or more generally referred to the key ability of 
mediators to develop trust which was not always seen as essential in other professions. 
7 think you aspire to be genuine...! think genuineness is a fundamental attribute 
for a mediator...not to have to fake it is important...it is possible to fake it ...I 
would hope if my sons were säting on a wall of a médiation watching me 
operate they'd say yes that's dad doing his usua! stuff. I'm not frightened of 
bringing my personality into a médiation...l'm not sure genuineness necessariiy 
betokens success as a lawyer.. .it might betoken a more saf/sfactory relationship 
with your clients or your colleagues .. .rather than fabricating, politicking or some 
of the other attributes of non-genuineness. The most devious are those 
sometimes who succeed and that may be true of other professions.. .it would be 
hard to conceive of a truly devious mediator ...that sort of person would be 
sussed. ' (M6) 
'A lawyer, I think, in some ways has to discard any thought of being 
genuine...genuineness doesn't corne into it. Integrity does. That's a différent 
thing as I see it because I have to obey the rules.. .that's to do with professional 
integrity. It's différent to genuineness. A mediator who isnt genuine isnt 
mediating.. .If a doctor is dealing with a patient then, I think, the patient has a 
hght to expect genuineness. It's more difficult for me to see how genuineness is 
désirable or a required attribute for, say, an accountant or lawyer because it 
doesn't seem to me to be relevant. What is relevant is compétence, integrity, 
honesty, adhérence to a code of conduct...the only case where I think 
genuineness might be involved is if the professional is dealing with people and 
is interacting with people and in that context to be ungenuine is to be false and 
to be false is always bad, as I see it, but that's as a human being rather than in 
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the capacity of professional except where the professional has such a high 
degree of personal involvement, like a doctor thaï genuineness is a required 
attribuîe.' (M4) 
7 think the skills of a mediator can exist in a person whatever their 
profession...and it may be that there are common human qualities that are 
totaily disregarding the profession. In other words the profession they're in could 
be an accident and the thing that makes them a mediator could be a common 
skill, common attitude.. .what marks a good mediator more than anything are 
their personal skills, their ability to build trust. So I don't think it's related to any 
profession...My belief is that trust is fundamental to ail relationships and 
therefore something that is precious and automatic.i think some people are 
effective in their profession without the need to build trust...because they're 
Rottweilers ...someone might use [a professional] who falls under that category 
because he falls under that category and that trust doesn't corne into it. You're 
using that person as a means to an end. ' (M5) 
7 am me. I canï be anybody else...l don't try and prétend to be anything eise. 
Incidentally, even though we ail have individual styles I suspect that any one of 
us, picking up any médiation, would probably corne with the same resuit even 
though our styles were différent which actually says that the clients are there 
looking to résolve and the mediator is almost irrelevant In many instances iï's 
almost Hke the Hippocratic oath or Buddhist oath, " do no harm", and an awful 
lot of what we do, as long as it is not harmful, the parties will take and find the 
résolution if they want to. ' (M2) 
However, reflecting on potential value clashes that mediators might have with types of 
médiation case (and expressing one of the fundamental points this project is 
addressing): 
7 hope that mediators would feel, should feel, that they can say this one for me 
is too close to the bone. It's not about conflict of interest...and if that is likely to 
jeopardise your ability to work with those parties most effectively then you 
should say this one is not for me...l would fear that most mediators would take 
opportunités as they arise wähout choosing to look at the personal difficulties 
for them...l don't think mediators on the whole would turn something down 
because they thought the material was not for them. ' (M8) 
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Personal responsibility 
Mediators comments on régulation reflected their sense of persona) responsibility in 
connection with the perceived State of maturity of the profession and public protection 
from bad practice. But this did not mean that submitting to régulation was securing 
professional legitimacy on the basis of an established skills and knowledge base, more 
a récognition of developing an interdisciplinary area of practice. 
7 Start off on the basis that in order to heip people résolve a dispute you have to 
be a skiiled negotiator...but then behind that there is a séries of 
questions.. .what is a good negotiator? Is it someone who understands the 
positions, the laws, the Statutes or, and it shouldnt be "or" but "and," eiements 
of human interaction, emotional issues...is that also part of the negotiators 
armoury? I think it is...a little bit of a psychologist there as well, not trained as 
such, but it cornes with expérience...and then to understand the area in which 
they're working...all the things that need to make the deal work...an awareness 
of the legal structure in which you are negotiating ...ail of that carries into 
médiation...So where I see any issues of codification [régulation] - because 
that's what the law is applying to mediators - is to be aware of what is within the 
legal structure in which you are mediating. I speak about creating the space. 
Within that is also Controlling what's in the space and so I am a gatekeeper. I try 
not to evaluate...So there is an area where régulation is appropriate. Whether 
this means mediators ail have to be iawyers?...as a non-lawyer talking to a non-
lawyer I think we would say this is not necessàry. We're not going to advise 
them on law.. .but there is an issue there. ' (M2) 
7 suppose I do think the best mediators are born not made.. .it is perfectly 
possible to learn the skills...! don't go into a médiation thinking very hard I must 
do what was taught on the course...! do believe it's a template which you are 
free to adapt to meet the circumstances you confront. ' (M6) 
A similar perspective was adopted by another mediator. When asked what mediator's 
needed to know to practise: 
'The short and simple answeris nothing because I still think there are some 
naturals and the naturals do it naturally...1 don't put myselfin the category ofa 
natural mediator and, therefore, what I have done is learnt and taught what you 
have to do as a mediator. Sînce there are very few people who are naturals one 
does need to be taught the skills, by and large. In many ways you need to be 
taught what not to do...you obviously need to understand the theoretical 
process of médiation and your function within that.. .the art of being 
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neutral...you dont need any legal knowledge as such...you don't need any 
íechnical knowledge. I think it helps to nave an understanding of the way people 
opérate.. People skills, as such, again are things that can't necessarily be 
taught...! think it also helps to like people, basically. I sometimes worry that i get 
too high-bound by all the theory and practice' (M7) 
' They need to know who they are and what they bring in terms of their person 
and skills.. .1 think they need to know very little. They may need to have read 
and understood a particular case... This is more about understanding than 
knowing. I think they need to understand the context in which the case is taking 
place...that clearly might invoive knowing some things about it but they need to 
understand it because each case wilf have a different backdrop and it is that 
backdrop against which you are mediating.' (M8) 
'There isn 't a best practice. There 's onty the best we know at this moment.. .like 
counselling I guess. ' (M1) 
The same mediator likened the National Vocational Qualification in mediation to 'brain 
surgery by numbers.' 
'...on the one hand, i look at people who do environmental faciiitation, 
management consultants, trainers, áreas which have some similariiy with 
commercial mediation which get sorted out by the market...so, no, just let the 
market decide. On the other hand, there's the fací of people doing it badly and 
giving mediation a bad name...at least that [accreditation under the CEDR 
course] can curb some of the worst excesses...! think the fact that it has been 
recognised as a basic minimum is a good thing.. .in some way perhaps it's about 
educating the market about the different types of mediation so they know at 
least what type they're getting...so if they want someone who's going to be 
evaluative they get that and not think that all mediations are like that, likewise 
with facilitative.. .It [regulation] seems something that is more important where 
you've got some sort of mandatory programme.. .when people don't have a 
cholee then I think it's important people do have some sort of regulation.. .for the 
more sophisticated users then I think it's probably less important...there's 
something about once you start deíining what it is that you do, in a way it starts 
to crystallise and become more limited and there's a danger of tosing creativity 
and a sense of evolution.. .also there's the difficulty of it becoming too 
theoretical.. .psychotherapy was quite a mature profession, if you can cali it that, 
before it became regulated....i would prefer something more intermedíate...an 
association...mínimum standards...developmentaf, sharing of ideas, support 
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groups.. If one extrême is the "Chartered tnstitute of Mediators" and tbe other is 
we should just go off and do our own thing, which doesn't seem right either... 
What's the middle ground or new model?' (M3) 
'The government, I think, are inevitably going to move more and more towards 
court mandated médiation.. .the courts are already finding it difficult to draw up a 
list of approved mediators or people they feel have a recognised standard of 
médiation ability. So inevitably someone is going to say they have to be 
qualified and how do you measure that qualification.. .it will satisfy the 
government...of needing something tangible rather than this awful thing, in their 
eyes, of recommending individuals who are known to be good...but I suppose 
for the fear of being seen to be favouring individuals it's easier to pick a 
standard or pick a body. ' (M5) 
General summary 
Thèse mediators' statements not only bring to light the complexity of the concept of the 
trusted mediator but begin to challenge some of the assumptions regarding the 
traditional ethical framework associated with professions and professionalisation such. 
as daims to a knowledge base, regulatory mechanisms and institutional organisation. 
But the mediators' statements may also hint at a category of profession emerging out of 
a reaction to bureaucratisation. Thèse issues are touched on in the final chapter. 
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7 THE TRUSTED MEDIATOR 
Being professional v being a professional 
Professionalisation 
Commercial mediators are committed to a service ideal but this is a service ideal that is 
not yet fully defined in its value orientations towards professionalisation. Brown and 
Marriott (1999) comment that professionalisation is sometimes seen as a threat to 
process informality in médiation: 
'Even those who are uneasy about professionalisation acknowledge that it is "an 
ambiguous concept." tt can refer either to éléments of professional activity 
perceived as dubious, such as eiitism, detachment and dient disempowerment, 
or to those more positive and inhérent features of professions, such as 
independence, training, responsibiïity, expertise and comm'ttment to appropriate 
values'74 (Brown and Marriott, 1999: p.140). 
W e are taking the line that professionalisation is a process which involves both an 
ethical and ideological strategy for an occupational group; a strategy that is inextricably 
linked to the form of relationship the occupational group has with the State. This is 
significant because the State dépends on its relationship with occupations whose 
practices produce social définitions relevant to state functions and, at the same time, the 
occupational group is dépendent on the State to establish the conditions for practice. 
Given that there are numerous viewpoints, agendas and negotiations unique to each 
occupation we have discarded the idea that there can be a Single attribute that can be 
used to trawl all occupations called professions and consequently have not attempted to 
show what the occupation of commercial médiation might share with other occupations 
that correspond to an ideal model of profession. Our concern is not what constitutes a 
profession but rather the circumstances that lead to professionalisation and what type of 
profession commercial médiation may become. So the parameters for a description of 
the conditions for the professionalisation of commercial médiation are not to be found by 
attempting to see whether commercial médiation qualifies as a profession or not. 
It will also be the unique characteristics of the occupation of commercial médiation 
which will have to influence policy on professionalisation and the ethical framework in 
which it is enabled as opposed to policy being determined on the basis of traditional 
(idealised) characteristics of a profession. The characteristics of this opposition are set 
As Brown and Marhott's own footnote says, this may not be probtematic for those mediators who are highly 
seulement focused but may be uncomfortable for those mediators who place high value on empowerment and 
problem-solving. 
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out in Figure 4 and are now reviewed in terms of potential policy implications regarding 
training, accountability and organisation. 
Profession 
{Trusted mediator) 
Compétence to deal with the particular situation 
Client as equal (doing things with) 
Ideology and developed ethical perception 
Activity as a way of expressing own identity and 
personality 
Person: genuineness and empathy 
Personal responsibility and group 
accountability 
Virtue ethics orientation (suggested) 
Lower bureaucracy 
Professionalisation influenced by the above 
Profession 
(Traditional/idealised) 
Expertise 
Client (doing things for) 
Code of Ethics 
Activity as means to an end 
Perso na 
Régulation 
Duty ethics orientation 
Higher bureaucracy 
Professionalisation assumed by 
the above 
Flg 9. Contrasting ethical frameworks 
Government's vision and reforms 
The increasing cost and duration of civil litigation gave force to the development of 
commercial médiation in support of the government's Access to Justice project to make 
the civil courts more efficient and cost effective in an attempt to deter people from the 
combative process of litigation. Indeed the government, through the Lord Chancellor's 
'pledge', avoided the potential criticism that in asking the public to carefully consider not 
going to court it did not exclude ïts own departments and agencies. 
We also need to remember that the government's concept of justice is made up of two 
components. One emphasises the government's responsibility to deliver legal services 
which are efficient, cost-effective and, therefore, accessible. The second emphasises 
the administration of justice relevant to when a dispute arises. In this sensé justice 
reflects the décisions taken in the courts, the accountability of the legal services and 
their ability to provide independent advtce. 
Civil justice is not simply an arena in which disputes are resolved but a System that aims 
to provide and encourage dispute avoidance: 
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'The Government believes that the civil justice system must play an integral part 
in supporting good citizenship. It is not just about the resolution of disputes. It is 
a system which provides a framework which guides the conduct of individuáis 
and organisations within society' (Lord Chancellor's Department: 
civil.justice.2000, 2002: p.12) 
This statement is linked to the government's visión in the use of technology based 
s y s t e m s : 7 5 
'...once there is greater access to the law, and guidance on it through electronic 
means.. .experts in a field may adjudícate rather than experts in the law, in an 
increasing number of cases' (Lord Chancellor's Department. Civil.justice.2000, 
2002: p.24) 
So the occupation of commercial mediation is not only seen as a resource for the 
administration and management of the justice system but also as a resource for its 
moral transformation; a resource to simultaneously maintain social order and effect 
social change which also happens to be functioning within a technology reliant free 
market. 
Legal profession 
As the vast majority of court cases do settle, the government's aims, encapsulated by 
Lord Woolfs reforms, will be evaluated by whether cases settle earlier without the 
stranglehold of costs and, subsequently, whether those settlements result in fairer 
outcomes. Therefore, the government's aims are as much to do with changing the 
practices of the legal profession as they are to do with encouraging the use of 
commercial mediation. This feature is important in that whether or not commercial 
mediators see what they do as an ¡ndependent discipline or not, they function as 
mediators who include many lawyers who act as mediators as part of their legal 
practice. As such the development of commercial mediation in the UK is best 
understood in terms of prívate enterprise developing a market for a public service which 
is closely associated with the civil justice system but is not, in its delivery, necessarily 
based on knowledge of the law, irrespective of the fact that there are lawyer mediators 
and that some mediation service providers only use lawyer mediators. 
Lawyers domínate the practice of commercial mediation but they do not engulf it. Some 
lawyer mediators may wish to define mediation in a way that could elimínate non-lawyer 
mediators but acceptance of a profession of commercial mediation could also be seen 
'NHS Direct' is an exampie 
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as a potential threat to lawyers who could be barred from mediating as part of their lega! 
practice. More significantly, lawyers have continued to remain the gatekeepers to 
potential mediation clients and have an influence on the choice of lawyer or non-lawyer 
mediators. 
One lawyer's response to why buyers of mediation prefer lawyers as mediators was 
that: 
'...lawyers are perceived by the public at large as dispute management 
specialists. If a person has a tax problem they will seek the advice of an 
accountant; if their roof leaks they will engage the services of a builder; equally, 
when they have a dispute, they will, when all else fails, generaliy consult a 
lawyer or embark unaided upon litigation where they expect, ultimately, their 
dispute to come to come before a legally qualified judge. 
As mediation is a form of dispute management, lawyers are the instinctive 
choice of the parties to act as mediators. That the skills of a mediator may be 
very different from those of a judge, arbitrator or adjudicator is a subtiety lost on 
most of the laity and probably also to a large extent on many solicitors and 
barristers. It is also unquestionably the case that many lawyer mediators are 
appointed by the legal advisors to parties because they are known quantities as 
current or erstwhile, fellow litigators. 
The situation is likely to change, at least in the commercial field, to the extent 
that the mediator is becoming a recognised species rather than some sort of 
hybrid sub-set of an existing professional group, whether lawyers, accountants, 
architects or other specialists. I have no idea of numbers but there are plenty of 
non-lawyer arbitrators practising in the construction and maritime fíelds, each of 
whom is judged on their proven ability as an arbitrator and whose standing is 
every bit as high as that of their legally qualified fellows. There is no good 
reason to believe that the same cannot be true of mediators. 
The position of the competent, unappointed, non-lawyer mediator is little 
different from that of the competent, unappointed, lawyer mediator; the parties, 
when given a choice, preferred somebody else.' (www, cedr.co. 
uk/exchange/discussion/003 17 April 2002) 
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But what would détermine the choice between a lawyer mediator and a non-lawyer 
mediator if, as this lawyer believes, the mediator is not a 'sub-set of an existing 
professional g roup? ' 7 6 
Learning capability v defîned body ofknowledge and expertise 
Commercial médiation does tolerate the idea of a professional discipline: 
'...commercial disputes...generaily require some levé! of expérience and 
expertise from the mediator. Some knowledge of the law and of legal concepts 
may weil also be helpful, particufariy when trying to settle cases in the context of 
pending iitigation. An argument against expertise is that the greater the 
perceived expertise and authority, the more the parties may be influenced into 
accepting the mediator's authority and moved away from their own control of the 
résolution'77 (Brown and Marriott, 1999: p.141). 
Beyond process understanding the professional daim to commercial médiation lies 
more in learning capability across disciplines and a high level of interpersonal skills than 
it does on the possession of a highly defined body of technical knowledge or core 
theoretica! model. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to instil through training personal characteristics that pré­
figure compétence in médiation. The mediator very much uses his or her own 
personality as an instrument of the médiation through which his or her skills are 
transmitted. So the expert who works with a defined body of knowledge appears less 
relevant in commercial médiation but that does not mean that the commercial mediator 
cannot be an expert in médiation. The point is that médiation is not capable of being 
reduced to a neat set of skills that guarantee or predict its outcome. The link, therefore, 
between training and effectiveness is not a secure one because an effective mediator 
does not get that way by taking lengthy training. 
Undoubtedly, there is a compelling drive to undertake training. But the assumption that 
there is a direct link between training and compétence with training being a process that 
makes a person into a compétent mediator which they would not otherwise have been is 
not what is significant. What is significant is that people are in the position to choose to 
embark upon more training as a way of Connecting their personality and identity within 
an area of practice where knowledge cannot be standardised, is continually developing, 
variable and, by nature, uncertain. 
7 6 And setting aside the possibîlity of lawyer-tawyer favouritism. 
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The threat, however, lies in the idea of the 'generalisf mediator; the fuzzy middle ground 
of 'one mediator fits all.' It is increasingly the case that commercial mediators do tend to 
mediate disputes in areas which they are technically or legally proficient; areas in which 
they are a professional . 7 8 
But this is not emerging in mediator training generally. Mediation is an approach, 
something people can do and acquire skills in their own fields of activity to improve. It is 
not a profession in the shape of law or medicine but that is different from saying that 
mediators cannot be professional. 
Regulation and accountability 
Training, however, soon moves on to the question of accreditation and regulation and to 
what extent they are necessary. There are a number of mediation organisations that 
provide both training courses and have an accreditation function but Standards may be 
different. Accreditation, however, is not a definitive measure of competence nor a 
guarantee for those who have been accredited that they will be able to pursue a career 
as a commercial mediator. 
The more commercial mediation becomes enshrined in the civil justice system the more 
the likelihood of pressure to set and conform to Standards in practice. So where 
commercial mediation remains a voluntary and without prejudice arrangement between 
the parties, regulation is less of a concern. But where the courts increasingly refer cases 
to mediation or strongly urge the parties to attempt mediation, there may be a 
temptation to make moves to establish a regulatory body to give comfort and confidence 
to the courts. 
This view encompasses professionalisation as a form of social control which stresses 
the interest of consumer or dient protection, safeguarding against bad practice and well-
meaning incompetence. The government will need to weigh this against its overall Vision 
of the civil justice system because regulation could lead to prescribing a procedural 
model for mediation and prohibit the dissemination of the social transformation message 
of mediation to encourage parties to mediate themselves; that is, where lawyers and 
other Professionals practicing in their own capacities function in a partisan role for their 
At a minimum, a theoretical and practical knowledge of negotiation is required but that is not something 
special to commercial mediators 
7 8 CEDR's selection procedura and matching of mediator to dispute atready covers this and indeed there are 
many recognised mediators in particular sectors such as clinical negligence and constmction, for example. 
Professional background is coupledwith personal attributes such as whetherthe mediator is highly directive or 
less directive etc. Soitisa question of the degree to which a professional is required (lawyer or otherwise) in 
respect of technical, legal or sector knowledge that Clients will expect from the mediator for their particular 
dispute. 
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Clients or act as intermediaries, approaching negotiations in the spirit of médiation and 
avoiding disputes. 
Regulation and accountability, however, need not be bundled together; anti-regulation 
does not mean anti-accountability. 
Organisation 
Morris, with whom we started this paper, calls for the préservation and value of the 
diversity of médiation practice (commercial and otherwise) and reacts against aspects of 
a particular description of professionalisation which focuses on the self-interest of 
él i tes. 7 9 The negative conséquences of professionalisation are seen to lie primarily in 
bureaucratisation, the aspects of which are seen to embody commercial advantage, 
competitiveness and résistance to alternative forms of accountability. This recalls the 
picture of professionalisation adopted by Larson (1977) who sees professionalisation as 
a project of collective social mobility where Professionals as a group usually enjoy 
higher social Status than do members of other occupational groups. 
But an increase in social prestige does not corne about automatically as a by-product of 
professionalisation. It would have to be a goal deliberately pursued by the professional 
associations which implement a strategy designed to secure higher social prestige for 
their members. In the UK there is currently no Single médiation organisation which 
controls or has the capacity to control entry and exit from the Community of commercial 
mediators nor has there been any active lobbying of government for special privilèges to 
say that commercial médiation is différent from other occupations so that it can qualify 
as a profession. 
Larson conceptualises professionalisation as a method of social stratification congruent 
with the System based on wealth. But, as we have already said, this is not the 
Standpoint we adopt. It also misses the more fundamental point that the government's 
economic strategy encompasses encouragement of the private sector to take on the 
rôle of a public sector provider of which commercial médiation is an example. This 
aspect alone is likely to détermine the degree to which government intervention will take 
place in commercial médiation practice and, therefore, its active rather than passive rôle 
in professionalisation. 
Commercial médiation is an individualistic practice but for the purposes of accountability 
and trust, not prestige, mediators will find it difficult to work as individuals without 
It would be difficult to deny that no self-inteœst is involved but that does not mean that there is, at the same 
time, a genuine concem for clients. Nordoes the degree of setf-interest or public interest dictate the 
possibilities ofhow Professionals can organise themselves. 
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belonging to a group. But that group does not need to be a conglomerate or single 
organisation. There is no reason to suggest that commercial mediators cannot work as a 
network of autonomous groups which do not try to define médiation. The form of 
accountability, therefore, need not be a highly bureaucratie structure in the model of 
established professional institutions 8 0 but can take the shape of peer assessment and 
accréditation within a practitioner network, coupled with formai client feedback. 8 1 This 
questions the assumption that there is a need to bring together the différent fields of 
médiation into a profession that has the same sort of status as, say, law. 
Final reflections on professionalisation 
'It is horrible to think that the worid couid one day be filled with nothing but those 
little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving toward bigger ones...This 
passion for bureaucracy:. .is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if in 
politics.. .we were to deliberately to become men who need "order" and nothing 
but order, become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers, 
and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it. That the 
worid should know no men but thèse: it is in such an évolution that we are 
already caught up, and the great question, therefore, not how we can promote 
and hasten it, but what can we oppose to this machiner/ in order to keep a 
portion of mankind free from this parcelling-out of the soul, from this suprême 
masteryofthe bureaucratie wayoflife' (Weber, 1921: p. 224) 
This whole process of rationalisation in the factory and elsewhere, and 
especialiy in the bureaucratie state machine, paralleis the centralisation of the 
material implements of organisation in the hands of the master. Thus, discipline 
inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction of poiitical and 
économie needs is increasingly rationalised. This universal phenomenon more 
and more restricts the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated 
conduct' (Weber, 1921/1968: p.1156) 
Criticisms of the established professions are usually formulated around their 
monopolistic practice, limiting entry into the market, and pursuing self-regulation to avoid 
the discipline of the courts and the rigours of the market. But it is precisely the context of 
the market and the level of bureaucratisation that may be giving rise to a new type of 
profession that gives it a legitimate rôle. 
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/( is questionable to what extent current forms of professionalised structures actually provide any reliable 
client protection. 
8 1 CEDR is already adopting much of this approach. 
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Put together emphasis on autonomy, a trend towards higher spécialisation and 
individualisation with the increasing influence of business professions such as 
accountants, lawyers and bankers working on international projects, commercial 
médiation could be seen as a product for the global market and an antidote to some of 
its manifestations. 
If we attach Gidden's view of the transference of trust from Professionals to abstract 
Systems to Weber's prophétie but gloomy vision of 'jobsworths,' the practice of 
commercial médiation can be seen as an attempt to counteract some of the impersonal 
nature of the delivery of professional services. Personal contact and the ability to deal 
with human affairs may become increasingly important in a technology based economy 
which can now offer detailed information or capability on many areas of once defined 
professional knowledge or expertise. 8 2 
A s to virtue ethics, its big plus is that it makes ethics more sensitive to everyday social 
and personal complexities which încludes what sort of person one should be if one is 
engaged in a professional activity. The overlap between personal and professional 
ethics becomes acute and extends to the question to what degree the model of a 
virtuous agent that is applicable in personal life is also applicable in professional life. 
Particularly in a global market, a profession's ethics have to function at a broad societal 
level which seems, on the face of it, to be difficult to reconcile with an ethical approach 
whose primary focus is the life and character of individual agents. However, virtue ethics 
leaves open the door to the idea of professionalism which is not independent of an idea 
of why professions émerge and what they are for. 
In the case of commercial médiation, the 'ideology of professionalism' which is 
associated with the length of a formal professional éducation which may, as Hughes 
describes it, encompass some sort of moral 'saturation' that is somehow self-fulfilling is 
much less relevant, if at all, than being able to engage in an ethical situation. 
At the same time a theory of profession which misses a description of the countervailing 
ethical tensions which are an intrinsic part of its own conception leave us at best with an 
incomplète theory or, at worst, with a theory of no conséquence. In that sensé 
professionalism and being professional belongs to ethics not the other way around. 
T h e greal change in professions is not the nature of the knowledge which provides their base. The great 
change is in the nature of the advice. The way to provide advice which appears to eliminate risk and provide 
certainty to the consumer is to make the delivery of the advice and provide certainty to the consumer is to 
make the delivery of the advice more impersonal... Advice becomes commoditised.' (Bruce, 2001: p.5) 
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It is in this territory where the concept of the trusted mediator intercèdes; a concept 
which holds the tension-ridden connection between professional and business ethics 
within the similarly tension-ridden relation of being within a profession and being 
professional. Critical to that holding opération is trust. 
Moving forward 
Continuing from this exploratory case study: 
(1) Publishers are in the process of being approached and this will involve 
gathering more illustrative case material; in particular, material from client 
sources. 
(2) Already in progress as a resuit of the initial papers referred to on p14 and p16, 
the researcher was invited to join the Royal Society of Arts Advisory Group on 
its 'Professional Values' project and will be involved in the facilitation of a one 
day conférence to be held in October 2002 and other events. 
(3) The value emphases identified in the the mediator interviews are positioned in a 
spectrum between médiation as a negotiation and médiation as an equity 
process. Prompted by this and the statement made by mediator M8 on p86, an 
ethics module for C E D R registered mediators is to be drafted. The purpose of 
the module is to raise awareness of the 'ethical bandwidths' in which mediators 
are pre-disposed to working. 
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